School of Business Administration, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China.
College of Mathematics and Statistics, Huanggang Normal University, Huanggang 438000, China.
Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2023 Jan 20;20(3):1944. doi: 10.3390/ijerph20031944.
With the continuous spread of cap-and-trade mechanisms and consumers' great concerns about environmental issues, manufacturers strive to reduce carbon emissions. Unfortunately, they are not always willing to disclose their accurate emission reductions or may even falsify emission reduction information. By developing a signaling model, we explore the impact of the cap-and-trade mechanism and asymmetric information on the decision-making of supply chain members composed of a manufacturer regulated by the cap-and-trade mechanism, and a retailer. As a result, we show that the low-type manufacturer has the incentive to mimic the pricing behavior of the high-type manufacturer under information asymmetry. Thus, in order to avoid this mimicry, the high-type manufacturer will distort the wholesale price. Moreover, the impact of the cap-and-trade mechanism on the manufacturer depends on the initial quotas. Only when the initial quota is in the middle range does the high-type manufacturer benefit, while the low-type manufacturer suffers. Furthermore, the low-type manufacturer tends to hide emission reduction information, while the high-type manufacturer tends to disclose the information. We also address how information asymmetry weakens the emission reduction advantages of the high-type manufacturer. However, the cap-and-trade mechanism can effectively alleviate this negative effect.
随着总量管制与排放交易机制的不断普及以及消费者对环境问题的高度关注，制造商努力减少碳排放。然而，他们并不总是愿意披露其准确的减排量，甚至可能伪造减排信息。通过开发信号传递模型，我们探讨了总量管制与排放交易机制和信息不对称对由受总量管制与排放交易机制监管的制造商和零售商组成的供应链成员决策的影响。结果表明，在信息不对称下，低类型制造商有动机模仿高类型制造商的定价行为。因此，为了避免这种模仿，高类型制造商将扭曲批发价格。此外，总量管制与排放交易机制对制造商的影响取决于初始配额。只有当初始配额处于中等范围时，高类型制造商才受益，而低类型制造商则受损。此外，低类型制造商往往会隐藏减排信息，而高类型制造商则倾向于披露信息。我们还探讨了信息不对称如何削弱高类型制造商的减排优势。然而，总量管制与排放交易机制可以有效地缓解这种负面影响。
