School of International Trade and Economics, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, 100029, China.
Environ Sci Pollut Res Int. 2022 Nov;29(55):82855-82872. doi: 10.1007/s11356-022-21231-9. Epub 2022 Jun 27.
This study considers a supply chain consisting of a dominant brand-name retailer and a manufacturer in the presence of a cap-and-trade mechanism and consumers' low-carbon preference. The retailer exerts advertising efforts, while lacks of the manufacturer's private carbon emission reduction effort cost information. We construct the benchmark model with information symmetry and asymmetry respectively. We obtain all members' equilibrium solutions and analytically examine the impact of the manufacturer's carbon emission reduction effort cost, the retailer's advertising effort cost, and consumers' low-carbon preference on the supply chain members' decisions. And then, we systematically compare two scenarios to obtain the condition in which the manufacturer would be willing to share the private information. With the aim of improving the manufacturer's carbon emission reduction effort level and all members' economic performance, we further propose a two-part tariff contract for information symmetry and asymmetry, respectively.
本研究考虑了一个由主导品牌零售商和制造商组成的供应链，存在总量管制与交易机制和消费者的低碳偏好。零售商进行广告投入，而制造商的私人碳减排努力成本信息不透明。我们分别构建了信息对称和不对称的基准模型。我们得到了所有成员的均衡解，并分析了制造商的碳减排努力成本、零售商的广告努力成本和消费者的低碳偏好对供应链成员决策的影响。然后，我们系统地比较了两种情况，以获得制造商愿意分享私人信息的条件。为了提高制造商的碳减排努力水平和所有成员的经济绩效，我们进一步分别为信息对称和不对称提出了两部收费合同。
