Management Science and Engineering Postdoctoral Mobile Station, Shandong Normal University, Ji'nan 250014, China.
Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200030, China.
Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2018 Nov 16;15(11):2570. doi: 10.3390/ijerph15112570.
More and more countries employ the Carbon Cap and Trade mechanism (CCT-mechanism) to stimulate the manufacturer to produce much more eco-friendly products. In this paper, we study how the CCT-mechanism affects competitive manufacturers' product design and pricing strategies. Assume that there are two competitive manufacturers; we give the optimal closed form solutions of the carbon emission reduction rates and retail prices in the Nash game model and the Stackelberg game model with CCT-mechanism, respectively. Additionally, we also discuss the impacts of CCT-mechanism, consumer environmental awareness (CEA), and the sensitivity of switchovers toward price on the optimal carbon emission reduction rates, retail prices, and manufacturers' profits. We find that (i) when the carbon quota is not enough, there is a trade off between investing in producing much greener product and purchasing carbon quota; when the carbon price is not high, the manufacturer tends to purchase the carbon quota; and when the carbon price is much higher, the manufacturer is more willing to increase the environmental quality of the product; (ii) manufacturer's size affects product's emission reduction rate and manufacturer's optimal profit; larger manufacturer tends to produce much greener product, but it does not mean that he could obtain much more money than the small manufacturer; and (iii) the decision sequence changes manufacturer's strategies; the optimal emission reduction rate in Nash and Stackelberg game models are almost the same, but the differences of prices and profits between Nash and Stackelberg model's are much bigger.
越来越多的国家采用碳上限与交易机制（CCT 机制）来激励制造商生产更环保的产品。在本文中，我们研究了 CCT 机制如何影响竞争制造商的产品设计和定价策略。假设存在两个竞争制造商；我们分别在纳什博弈模型和带有 CCT 机制的斯塔克尔伯格博弈模型中给出了碳减排率和零售价格的最优闭式解。此外，我们还讨论了 CCT 机制、消费者环境意识（CEA）和对价格的转换敏感度对最优碳减排率、零售价格和制造商利润的影响。我们发现：（i）当碳配额不足时，在投资生产更环保的产品和购买碳配额之间存在权衡；当碳价不高时，制造商倾向于购买碳配额；当碳价高得多时，制造商更愿意提高产品的环境质量；（ii）制造商的规模影响产品的减排率和制造商的最优利润；较大的制造商往往生产更环保的产品，但这并不意味着它比小制造商获得更多的钱；（iii）决策顺序改变了制造商的策略；纳什和斯塔克尔伯格博弈模型中的最优减排率几乎相同，但纳什和斯塔克尔伯格模型之间的价格和利润差异要大得多。
