Business School, East China University of Political Science and Law, Shanghai 200042, China.
Academy of Plateau Science and Sustainability, Qinghai Normal University, Xining 810016, China.
Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2023 Feb 10;20(4):3156. doi: 10.3390/ijerph20043156.
Industrial parks are an essential component of China's reformation and opening, and they are the focus of sustainable economic and social development. However, in the process of further high-quality development, the relevant authorities have taken different approaches on whether to divest the social management functions of the parks, which introduces a dilemma of choice in reforming the management functions of these parks. This paper takes a comprehensive list of the hospitals providing public services in industrial parks as the representative subjects to clarify the factors influencing the selection of social management functions in industrial parks and the process in which they perform their roles. We also construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, the industrial parks, and the hospitals and discuss the management functions of reform in industrial parks. The results show the following: (1) the selection of social management functions in industrial parks is an evolutionary game process of the government, park, and hospital under bounded rationality; (2) whether the government divests the park's administrative authority over the hospital is affected by the cost of the government running the hospital and the additional benefits of the hospital's participation in the business environment co-creation; (3) whether the industrial park provides high subsidies to the hospital is affected by its reputation benefit and subsidy cost; (4) whether the hospital participates in business environment co-creation is affected by additional benefits, subsidies, and its participation cost. When considering whether the local government should strip the social management function of the park over the hospital, it is not possible to simply "choose one of the two" or adopt a "one-size-fits-all" approach. Instead, attention should be paid to the factors influencing the choice of the main behaviors of all parties, the allocation of resources from the overall perspective of regional economic and social development, and jointly improving the business environment to achieve win-win results among all parties.
工业园区是中国改革开放的重要组成部分，也是可持续经济和社会发展的重点。然而，在进一步高质量发展的过程中，有关部门对于是否剥离园区的社会管理职能采取了不同的方式，这在改革园区管理职能方面带来了选择困境。本文以工业园区提供公共服务的综合医院为代表，厘清园区社会管理职能选择及其履行角色的影响因素，并构建了政府、园区和医院三方演化博弈模型，探讨园区管理职能改革。结果表明：（1）园区社会管理职能的选择是政府、园区和医院在有限理性下的演化博弈过程；（2）政府是否剥离园区对医院的行政管理权，受到政府办医成本和医院参与营商环境共创的附加收益的影响；（3）园区是否向医院提供高额补贴，受到其声誉收益和补贴成本的影响；（4）医院是否参与营商环境共创，受到附加收益、补贴和参与成本的影响。地方政府在考虑是否剥离园区对医院的社会管理职能时，不能简单地“二选一”或“一刀切”，而应关注各方主要行为选择的影响因素、从区域经济社会发展的整体角度配置资源，共同改善营商环境，实现各方共赢。
