• 文献检索
  • 文档翻译
  • 深度研究
  • 学术资讯
  • Suppr Zotero 插件Zotero 插件
  • 邀请有礼
  • 套餐&价格
  • 历史记录
应用&插件
Suppr Zotero 插件Zotero 插件浏览器插件Mac 客户端Windows 客户端微信小程序
定价
高级版会员购买积分包购买API积分包
服务
文献检索文档翻译深度研究API 文档MCP 服务
关于我们
关于 Suppr公司介绍联系我们用户协议隐私条款
关注我们

Suppr 超能文献

核心技术专利:CN118964589B侵权必究
粤ICP备2023148730 号-1Suppr @ 2026

文献检索

告别复杂PubMed语法,用中文像聊天一样搜索,搜遍4000万医学文献。AI智能推荐,让科研检索更轻松。

立即免费搜索

文件翻译

保留排版,准确专业,支持PDF/Word/PPT等文件格式,支持 12+语言互译。

免费翻译文档

深度研究

AI帮你快速写综述,25分钟生成高质量综述,智能提取关键信息,辅助科研写作。

立即免费体验

信息战场:冲突认知激发了对敌方错误信息的信任和分享。

Information battleground: Conflict perceptions motivate the belief in and sharing of misinformation about the adversary.

机构信息

Institute of Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands.

Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark.

出版信息

PLoS One. 2023 Mar 22;18(3):e0282308. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0282308. eCollection 2023.

DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0282308
PMID:36947501
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10032542/
Abstract

Misinformation has emerged as a major societal concern. But why do citizens contribute to the dissemination of falsehoods online? This article investigates this question by focusing on the role of motivated reasoning and, in particular, perceptions of group-based conflict. It examines the effect of perceived conflict on the endorsement of false news in the context of a regional conflict between Russia and the West as experienced by Ukrainian citizens. In our survey experiment, a sample of Ukrainians (N = 1,615) was randomly assigned to read negative false news stories about Russia, the European Union or Tanzania-a country with no stakes in the conflict. The results show that higher perceived conflict between Ukraine and Russia makes Ukrainians less likely to endorse false news targeting the European Union, but more likely to endorse false news that paint a negative picture of Russia. This finding extends the support for motivated reasoning theory beyond Western contexts investigated so far. Importantly, the effects of conflict perceptions remain strong after controlling for group identity and political knowledge of participants. These results advance our understanding of why false information is disseminated and point to the importance of conflict de-escalation to prevent the diffusion of falsehoods.

摘要

错误信息已成为一个主要的社会关注点。但是,为什么公民会在网上传播虚假信息呢?本文通过关注动机推理的作用,特别是基于群体的冲突感知,来研究这个问题。它考察了在乌克兰公民经历的俄罗斯与西方之间的地区冲突背景下,感知到的冲突对支持虚假新闻的影响。在我们的调查实验中,一组乌克兰人(N=1615)被随机分配阅读关于俄罗斯、欧盟或坦桑尼亚的负面虚假新闻故事,坦桑尼亚与冲突没有利害关系。结果表明,乌克兰和俄罗斯之间感知到的冲突加剧,使乌克兰人不太可能支持针对欧盟的虚假新闻,但更有可能支持对俄罗斯持负面看法的虚假新闻。这一发现将动机推理理论的支持扩展到了迄今为止所调查的西方背景之外。重要的是,在控制参与者的群体身份和政治知识后,冲突感知的影响仍然很强。这些结果增进了我们对为什么会传播虚假信息的理解,并指出了冲突降级以防止虚假信息扩散的重要性。

https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/34b0/10032542/3772874edd9d/pone.0282308.g004.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/34b0/10032542/5b480465ceff/pone.0282308.g001.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/34b0/10032542/1f9586fddbd8/pone.0282308.g002.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/34b0/10032542/164f6ed68cdf/pone.0282308.g003.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/34b0/10032542/3772874edd9d/pone.0282308.g004.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/34b0/10032542/5b480465ceff/pone.0282308.g001.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/34b0/10032542/1f9586fddbd8/pone.0282308.g002.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/34b0/10032542/164f6ed68cdf/pone.0282308.g003.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/34b0/10032542/3772874edd9d/pone.0282308.g004.jpg

相似文献

1
Information battleground: Conflict perceptions motivate the belief in and sharing of misinformation about the adversary.信息战场:冲突认知激发了对敌方错误信息的信任和分享。
PLoS One. 2023 Mar 22;18(3):e0282308. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0282308. eCollection 2023.
2
Beliefs in Misinformation About COVID-19 and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine Are Linked: Evidence From a Nationally Representative Survey Study.关于新冠疫情的错误信息信念与俄罗斯对乌克兰的入侵信念有关联:来自一项全国代表性调查研究的证据。
JMIR Infodemiology. 2025 Mar 10;5:e62913. doi: 10.2196/62913.
3
Factors of Fake News Sharing in the Context of the Ukraine-Russia Conflict: The Effect of Suspicions About European Unions' Intentions.
Psychol Rep. 2024 Nov 15:332941241302260. doi: 10.1177/00332941241302260.
4
Correcting misinformation about the Russia-Ukraine War reduces false beliefs but does not change views about the War.纠正有关俄乌战争的错误信息会减少错误信念,但不会改变人们对战争的看法。
PLoS One. 2024 Sep 23;19(9):e0307090. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0307090. eCollection 2024.
5
Testing the effects of group-affirmation in active conflict: Ukrainians' trust toward Russia.检验群体肯定在积极冲突中的作用:乌克兰人对俄罗斯的信任。
PLoS One. 2023 May 18;18(5):e0270266. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0270266. eCollection 2023.
6
Fake news in the age of COVID-19: evolutional and psychobiological considerations.新冠疫情时代的假新闻:进化和心理生物学方面的考虑。
Psychiatriki. 2022 Sep 19;33(3):183-186. doi: 10.22365/jpsych.2022.087. Epub 2022 Jul 19.
7
Social and Healthcare Impacts of the Russian-Led Hybrid War in Ukraine - A Conflict With Unique Global Consequences.俄罗斯主导的乌克兰混合战争的社会与医疗影响——一场具有独特全球影响的冲突。
Disaster Med Public Health Prep. 2023 Jul 21;17:e432. doi: 10.1017/dmp.2023.91.
8
Correction: Information battleground: Conflict perceptions motivate the belief in and sharing of misinformation about the adversary.更正:信息战场:冲突认知促使人们相信并分享有关对手的错误信息。
PLoS One. 2024 Apr 18;19(4):e0302621. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0302621. eCollection 2024.
9
Sharing of misinformation is habitual, not just lazy or biased.错误信息的分享是习惯性的,不仅仅是因为懒惰或偏见。
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2023 Jan 24;120(4):e2216614120. doi: 10.1073/pnas.2216614120. Epub 2023 Jan 17.
10
Misremembering Brexit: partisan bias and individual predictors of false memories for fake news stories among Brexit voters.记错英国脱欧:英国脱欧选民对假新闻故事产生虚假记忆的党派偏见和个体预测因素。
Memory. 2021 May;29(5):587-604. doi: 10.1080/09658211.2021.1923754. Epub 2021 May 10.

引用本文的文献

1
Correction: Information battleground: Conflict perceptions motivate the belief in and sharing of misinformation about the adversary.更正:信息战场:冲突认知促使人们相信并分享有关对手的错误信息。
PLoS One. 2024 Apr 18;19(4):e0302621. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0302621. eCollection 2024.

本文引用的文献

1
Inoculating Against Fake News About COVID-19.防范关于新冠病毒的虚假消息
Front Psychol. 2020 Oct 23;11:566790. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.566790. eCollection 2020.
2
The evolutionary psychology of mass mobilization: how disinformation and demagogues coordinate rather than manipulate.大规模动员的进化心理学:虚假信息和煽动者如何协调而不是操纵。
Curr Opin Psychol. 2020 Oct;35:71-75. doi: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2020.02.003. Epub 2020 Feb 20.
3
Fake news on Twitter during the 2016 U.S. presidential election.2016年美国总统大选期间推特上的假新闻。
Science. 2019 Jan 25;363(6425):374-378. doi: 10.1126/science.aau2706.
4
Less than you think: Prevalence and predictors of fake news dissemination on Facebook.远低于你的想象:脸书上虚假新闻传播的流行程度和预测因素。
Sci Adv. 2019 Jan 9;5(1):eaau4586. doi: 10.1126/sciadv.aau4586. eCollection 2019 Jan.
5
Cognitive Reflection and the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.认知反思与 2016 年美国总统大选
Pers Soc Psychol Bull. 2019 Feb;45(2):224-239. doi: 10.1177/0146167218783192. Epub 2018 Jul 9.
6
The science of fake news.假新闻的科学。
Science. 2018 Mar 9;359(6380):1094-1096. doi: 10.1126/science.aao2998. Epub 2018 Mar 8.
7
Stripped of illusions? Exploring system justification processes in capitalist and post-Communist societies.摆脱幻想?探索资本主义和后共产主义社会中的制度合理化过程。
Int J Psychol. 2014 Feb;49(1):6-29. doi: 10.1002/ijop.12011. Epub 2013 Nov 20.
8
The weirdest people in the world?世界上最奇怪的人?
Behav Brain Sci. 2010 Jun;33(2-3):61-83; discussion 83-135. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X0999152X. Epub 2010 Jun 15.
9
The case for motivated reasoning.动机性推理的情况。
Psychol Bull. 1990 Nov;108(3):480-98. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480.