Zhang Xiao-Wei, Xu Letian, Wang Si-Yi, Wang Lin, Dunn Derek W, Yu Xiaoping, Ye Xinping
College of Life Sciences, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi'an 710119, China.
State Key Laboratory of Biocatalysis and Enzyme Engineering, School of Life Sciences, Hubei University, Wuhan 430062, China.
Foods. 2023 Apr 5;12(7):1538. doi: 10.3390/foods12071538.
Apiculture has been greatly developed in recent years in China. Beekeeping cooperatives and honey manufacturing enterprises have increased rapidly. As a result, a variety of honey products have entered the market, adding vitality to the food economy; however, the adulteration of honey products is on the rise in China. Previous attempts to control the adulteration of honey products mostly relied on technical, product-specific measures, and there was a lack of modeling research to guide the supervision of the honey product industry. In order to help local governments to better control the adulteration of honey products from a management perspective, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model composed of beekeeping cooperatives, honey product enterprises, and local governments. Through stability analysis and model simulation, we found that local government subsidies to cooperatives have little impact on the game system. Local government penalties to cooperatives and price adjustments of unadulterated raw honey by cooperatives are effective management tools to reduce the adulteration behavior of cooperatives. Local government penalties for enterprises are an effective management tool to reduce the adulteration behavior of enterprises. This research provides useful information for government agencies to design appropriate policies/business modes so as to promote sustainability and the healthy development of the honey product industry in China.
近年来,中国的养蜂业得到了极大发展。养蜂合作社和蜂蜜生产企业迅速增加。因此,各种各样的蜂蜜产品进入市场,为食品经济增添了活力;然而,中国蜂蜜产品掺假现象呈上升趋势。以往控制蜂蜜产品掺假的尝试大多依赖于技术性的、针对特定产品的措施,缺乏用于指导蜂蜜产品行业监管的模型研究。为了从管理角度帮助地方政府更好地控制蜂蜜产品掺假,本文建立了一个由养蜂合作社、蜂蜜产品企业和地方政府组成的演化博弈模型。通过稳定性分析和模型模拟,我们发现地方政府对合作社的补贴对博弈系统影响不大。地方政府对合作社的处罚以及合作社对纯正原蜜的价格调整是减少合作社掺假行为的有效管理手段。地方政府对企业的处罚是减少企业掺假行为的有效管理手段。本研究为政府机构设计合适政策/商业模式提供了有用信息,以促进中国蜂蜜产品行业的可持续发展和健康发展。