Shi Jinfa, Su Yongqiang
School of Management and Economics, North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power, Zhengzhou 450046, China.
Heliyon. 2023 Mar 29;9(4):e14982. doi: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e14982. eCollection 2023 Apr.
The high-quality development of the manufacturing industry is not only a requirement of industrial transformation and upgrading but also an internal task for the sustainable development of manufacturing enterprises. The high-quality development of the manufacturing industry is a process of multi-participation and dynamic evolution. To understand the evolution of the high-quality development of the manufacturing industry, an evolutionary game model composed of local governments, leading enterprises, and following enterprises is constructed. The evolution process and the influence of internal factors such as innovation capability, organization construction and industry resources on the evolution and stability strategy are analysed. MATLAB software is used to perform numerical simulations. The results show that (1) there are two possible evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) models in the game, namely, {active supervision, positive participation, positive participation} and {active supervision, negative participation, negative participation}; (2) when the initial probabilities of leading and following enterprises are all at low levels, increasing any one of the local government's initial probability, innovation capability, organization construction and industry resources can promote tripartite evolution towards {active supervision, positive participation, positive participation}; and (3) the convergence rate of leading enterprises and following enterprises evolving towards a positive participation strategy will increase slightly with an increase in local government's initial probability, innovation capability, organization construction, and industry resources when both are at middle initial probability levels. The final policy suggestions can be used to help all parties choose the optimal strategy and to achieve the high-quality development target of the manufacturing industry as soon as possible.
制造业高质量发展既是产业转型升级的要求,也是制造企业可持续发展的内在任务。制造业高质量发展是一个多方参与、动态演进的过程。为了解制造业高质量发展的演进情况,构建了一个由地方政府、龙头企业和跟随企业组成的演化博弈模型。分析了创新能力、组织建设和产业资源等内部因素对演化及稳定策略的影响。利用MATLAB软件进行数值模拟。结果表明:(1)博弈中存在两种可能的演化稳定策略(ESS)模型,即{积极监管,积极参与,积极参与}和{积极监管,消极参与,消极参与};(2)当龙头企业和跟随企业的初始概率均处于较低水平时,提高地方政府的初始概率、创新能力、组织建设和产业资源中的任何一项,都能促进三方朝着{积极监管,积极参与,积极参与}方向演化;(3)当龙头企业和跟随企业的初始概率均处于中等水平时,随着地方政府的初始概率、创新能力、组织建设和产业资源的增加,两者朝着积极参与策略演化的收敛速度将略有提高。最终的政策建议可用于帮助各方选择最优策略,尽快实现制造业高质量发展目标。