School of Management and Engineering, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070, China.
Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2019 Aug 3;16(15):2775. doi: 10.3390/ijerph16152775.
In recent years, with the rapid development of the economy, industrial pollution problems have become more and more serious. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model for industrial pollution between the local governments and enterprises to study the dynamic evolution path of a game system and the evolutionary stable strategy under two punishment mechanisms. The results show that, in a static punishment mechanism (SPM), the strategy between governments and enterprises is uncertain. Moreover, the evolutionary trajectory between governments and enterprises is uncertain. However, under the dynamic punishment mechanism (DPM), the evolution path between governments and enterprises tends to converge to a stable value. Thus, the DPM is more conducive than the SPM for industrial pollution control.
近年来，随着经济的快速发展，工业污染问题变得越来越严重。本文构建了地方政府与企业之间的工业污染演化博弈模型，以研究博弈系统的动态演变路径和两种惩罚机制下的演化稳定策略。研究结果表明，在静态惩罚机制（SPM）下，政府与企业之间的策略是不确定的，而且政府与企业之间的演化轨迹也是不确定的。然而，在动态惩罚机制（DPM）下，政府与企业之间的演化路径趋于收敛到一个稳定值。因此，DPM 比 SPM 更有利于工业污染控制。
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