School of Management Engineering, Qingdao University of Technology, Qingdao, China.
School of Civil Engineering, Qingdao University of Technology, Qingdao, China.
PLoS One. 2023 Jun 29;18(6):e0287684. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0287684. eCollection 2023.
This paper explores a two-level prefabricated building closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) comprising a retailer and a prefabricated building manufacturer (PBM) under carbon cap-and-trade legislation and the government subsidies of carbon emission reduction (CER). In this CLSC, the PBM and the retailer recycle used products through their independent recycling channels. The optimum pricing and CER strategies within both decentralized and centralized systems, respectively, are analyzed. The Stackelberg game is used in the decentralized system to determine the optimum PBM's CER level and the retailer's pricing. By analysis, it concludes that increasing the carbon trading price can stimulate prefabricated construction corporations to improve their CER level, and that the government subsidy rate has a great effect on the profits of the PBM. Numerical examples with sensitivity analysis are used to further evaluate the roles of important factors in the optimum CER and pricing solutions of the prefabricated building CLSC in two dissimilar systems.
本文探讨了在碳限额与交易立法和政府碳减排补贴（CER）下，由零售商和预制建筑制造商（PBM）组成的两级预制建筑闭环供应链（CLSC）。在这个 CLSC 中，PBM 和零售商通过他们各自的回收渠道回收用过的产品。分别分析了分散和集中系统中的最优定价和 CER 策略。在分散系统中使用 Stackelberg 博弈来确定 PBM 的最优 CER 水平和零售商的定价。通过分析得出，提高碳交易价格可以刺激预制建筑企业提高其 CER 水平，而且政府补贴率对 PBM 的利润有很大影响。使用数值例子和敏感性分析进一步评估了两个不同系统中预制建筑 CLSC 的最优 CER 和定价解决方案中的重要因素的作用。
