Guardascione Alessandro
School of Philosophy, University College of Dublin (UCD), Dublin, Ireland.
Front Psychol. 2023 Jul 7;14:1214474. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1214474. eCollection 2023.
This paper presents a critical comparison between two phenomenological accounts of schizophrenic experience: on the one side, Blankenburg's seminal work on the basal disturbance () of schizophrenia as loss of natural self-evidence (); on the other side, Tatossian's insight, briefly elaborated in a lecture presented in Heidelberg in 1994 and largely forgotten by the relevant literature. Whereas the former mainly develops an reading of schizophrenia, the latter suggests an understanding. Indeed, for Blankenburg, schizophrenic experience can be broadly characterized as a progressive impoverishment of our rootedness in the social world, leading to derealization and depersonalization. In this respect, Tatossian takes schizophrenic autism not as the effect of a loss of originary sociality but as the result of a deeper disproportion. For Tatossian, schizophrenia is characterized, ultimately, by a basic self-disorder or alteration that consists in the breakdown of the twofold dimension of transcendental subjectivity, encompassing both constituting consciousness and phenomenologizing onlooker. In this sense, his interpretation of schizophrenic disorders is closer to the ipseity-disturbance model. I show that while Blankenburg and Tatossian share a dialectical understanding of schizophrenia by pointing to basic modifications of the "transcendental organization" of experience, their divergence originates from a different reading of the phenomenological epoché. Except for the clinical perspective, the point of contention between Blankenburg and Tatossian seems to concern their use of internal resources of the Husserlian phenomenology. By presenting the philosophical presuppositions of their analyses, I discuss two key figures of phenomenological psychopathology by showing how their debate on the meaning of schizophrenic experience can be reframed by looking at the relationship between transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity in Husserl's phenomenology.
一方面是布兰肯伯格关于精神分裂症基础障碍（）即自然自明性丧失（）的开创性著作；另一方面是塔托西安的见解，这一见解在1994年于海德堡发表的一次讲座中得到简要阐述，但在相关文献中大多被遗忘。前者主要发展了一种对精神分裂症的 解读，而后者则提出了一种 理解。事实上，对布兰肯伯格而言，精神分裂症体验可大致被描述为我们在社会世界中根基的逐渐匮乏，导致现实感丧失和人格解体。在这方面，塔托西安并不将精神分裂症自闭症视为原初社会性丧失的结果，而是视为更深层次失衡的结果。对塔托西安来说，精神分裂症最终的特征是一种基本的自我紊乱或改变，这种紊乱或改变在于先验主体性双重维度的崩溃，这一双重维度既包括构成性意识，也包括进行现象学考察的旁观者。从这个意义上说，他对精神分裂症障碍的解释更接近自我紊乱模型。我表明，虽然布兰肯伯格和塔托西安通过指出体验的“先验组织”的基本变化而对精神分裂症有着辩证的理解，但他们的分歧源于对现象学悬搁的不同解读。除了临床视角外，布兰肯伯格和塔托西安之间的争论点似乎在于他们对胡塞尔现象学内部资源的运用。通过呈现他们分析的哲学预设，我通过展示如何通过审视胡塞尔现象学中先验主体性与主体间性的关系来重新构建他们关于精神分裂症体验意义的争论，从而讨论现象学精神病理学的两个关键人物。
