Zohny Hazem, Lyreskog David M, Singh Ilina, Savulescu Julian
Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK.
Department of Psychiatry, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK.
Neuroethics. 2023;16(3):20. doi: 10.1007/s12152-023-09525-2. Epub 2023 Aug 21.
The concept of mental integrity is currently a significant topic in discussions concerning the regulation of neurotechnologies. Technologies such as deep brain stimulation and brain-computer interfaces are believed to pose a unique threat to mental integrity, and some authors have advocated for a legal right to protect it. Despite this, there remains uncertainty about what mental integrity entails and why it is important. Various interpretations of the concept have been proposed, but the literature on the subject is inconclusive. Here we consider a number of possible interpretations and argue that the most plausible one concerns neurotechnologies that bypass one's reasoning capacities, and do so specifically in ways that reliably lead to alienation from one's mental states. This narrows the scope of what constitutes a threat to mental integrity and offers a more precise role for the concept to play in the ethical evaluation of neurotechnologies.
心理完整性的概念目前是关于神经技术监管讨论中的一个重要话题。诸如深部脑刺激和脑机接口等技术被认为对心理完整性构成独特威胁,一些作者主张赋予保护心理完整性的法律权利。尽管如此,对于心理完整性的内涵以及为何重要仍存在不确定性。人们已经提出了对该概念的各种解释,但关于这一主题的文献尚无定论。在此,我们考虑了一些可能的解释,并认为最合理的解释涉及绕过一个人推理能力的神经技术,而且是以可靠地导致与自身心理状态疏离的方式来绕过。这缩小了构成对心理完整性威胁的范围,并为该概念在神经技术伦理评估中发挥作用提供了更精确的定位。