Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, 08540, USA.
Princeton Neuroscience Institute, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, 08540, USA.
Nat Commun. 2019 May 23;10(1):2291. doi: 10.1038/s41467-019-10309-7.
Social life requires us to treat each person according to their unique disposition. To tailor our behavior to specific individuals, we must represent their idiosyncrasies. Here, we advance the hypothesis that our representations of other people reflect the mental states we perceive those people to habitually experience. We tested this hypothesis by measuring whether neural representations of people could be accurately reconstructed by summing state representations. Separate participants underwent functional MRI while considering famous individuals and individual mental states. Online participants rated how often each famous person experiences each state. Results supported the summed state hypothesis: frequency-weighted sums of state-specific brain activity patterns accurately reconstructed person-specific patterns. Moreover, the summed state account outperformed the established alternative-that people represent others using trait dimensions-in explaining interpersonal similarity. These findings demonstrate that the brain represents people as the sums of the mental states they experience.
社交生活要求我们根据每个人独特的性格来对待他们。为了根据特定个体调整我们的行为,我们必须代表他们的特质。在这里,我们提出了一个假设,即我们对他人的表现反映了我们所感知到的那些人习惯性地经历的心理状态。我们通过测量是否可以通过对状态表示进行求和来准确地重建其他人的表示来检验该假设。单独的参与者在考虑名人及其个人心理状态时接受了功能磁共振成像。在线参与者对每个名人经历每个状态的频率进行了评分。结果支持了总和状态假设:对特定状态的脑活动模式进行频率加权求和,可以准确地重建特定于人的模式。此外,总和状态解释了人际相似性,而不是使用特质维度来表示他人,这一说法要好于既定的替代方法。这些发现表明,大脑将人表示为他们所经历的心理状态的总和。