Pulcu Erdem
Department of Psychiatry, Psychopharmacology and Emotion Research Lab, Computational Psychiatry Lab, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK.
R Soc Open Sci. 2024 Mar 20;11(3):230867. doi: 10.1098/rsos.230867. eCollection 2024 Mar.
Inarguably, humans perform the richest plethora of prosocial behaviours in the animal kingdom, and these are important for understanding how humans navigate their social environment. The success and failure of strategies human players devise also have implications for determining long-term socio-economic/evolutionary fitness. Following the footsteps of Press and Dyson (2012), I implemented their evolutionary game-theoretic modelling from Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (a behavioural economic probe of interpersonal cooperation) and re-analysed already published data on human proposer behaviour in the Ultimatum Game (a behavioural economic probe of altruistic punishment) involving 50 human participants versus stochastic computerized opponents with prosocial and individualistic social value orientations. Although the results indicate that it is more likely to break cycles of mutual defection in ecosystems in which humans interact with individualistic opponents, analysis of social-economic fitness at the Markov stationary states suggested that this comes at an evolutionary cost. Overall, human players acted in a significantly more cooperative manner than their opponents, but they failed to overcome extortion from individualistic agents, risking 'extinction' in 70% of the cases. These findings demonstrate human players might be short-sighted, and social interactive decision strategies they devise while adjusting to different types of opponents may not be optimal in the long run.
无可争议的是，人类在动物王国中表现出最为丰富多样的亲社会行为，而这些行为对于理解人类如何在社会环境中生存至关重要。人类参与者所设计策略的成败，对于确定长期的社会经济/进化适应性也具有重要意义。追随普雷斯和戴森（2012年）的脚步，我采用了他们基于重复囚徒困境（一种人际合作的行为经济学探究）的进化博弈论模型，并重新分析了已发表的关于最后通牒博弈中人类提议者行为的数据（一种利他惩罚的行为经济学探究），该研究涉及50名人类参与者与具有亲社会和个人主义社会价值取向的随机计算机化对手。尽管结果表明，在人类与个人主义对手互动的生态系统中，更有可能打破相互背叛的循环，但对马尔可夫稳态下社会经济适应性的分析表明，这是以进化成本为代价的。总体而言，人类参与者的行为比对手明显更具合作性，但他们未能克服来自个人主义者的敲诈勒索，在70%的情况下有“灭绝”的风险。这些发现表明，人类参与者可能目光短浅，而且他们在适应不同类型对手时所设计的社会互动决策策略从长远来看可能并非最优。
