Qi Xue-Ting, Bu Fanliang
People's Public Security University of China, Beijing, China.
Sci Rep. 2024 Apr 27;14(1):9711. doi: 10.1038/s41598-024-59283-1.
Based on the system dynamics theory, this paper establishes an environmental mass event evolution model and explores the evolution law of mass events caused by environmental problems. From a methodological point of view, the mixed-strategy evolutionary game principle and dynamic punishment measures are combined, and simulation analysis is carried out by Anylogic software, and the results show that there is no stable evolutionary equilibrium solution for the two sides of the game in the traditional asymmetric mixed-strategy game model, and after adjusting the game payoff matrix and incorporating the dynamic punishment strategy, stable evolutionary equilibrium solutions appear in the evolutionary game model, and the system begins to tend to be stabilized. The process and conclusions of the simulation experiment provide methodological reference and theoretical support for the analysis of the evolution of environmental mass events.
基于系统动力学理论,本文建立了环境群体性事件演化模型,探究环境问题引发的群体性事件的演化规律。从方法论角度出发,将混合策略演化博弈原理与动态惩罚措施相结合,运用Anylogic软件进行仿真分析,结果表明,在传统的非对称混合策略博弈模型中博弈双方不存在稳定的演化均衡解,在调整博弈支付矩阵并纳入动态惩罚策略后,演化博弈模型中出现了稳定的演化均衡解,系统开始趋于稳定。仿真实验的过程和结论为环境群体性事件演化分析提供了方法论参考和理论支持。