Faculty of Transportation Engineering, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming 650500, China.
Yunnan Engineering Survey and Design Institute Group Co., Ltd., Kunming 650500, China.
Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2023 Feb 2;20(3):2686. doi: 10.3390/ijerph20032686.
In this article, we construct a game model that uses government regulators and scrap vehicle owners as the main parties to investigate the carbon credit exchange strategy of scrap vehicles using evolutionary game theory. The results were validated using Matlab simulation analysis to reveal the dynamic evolution process of the strategy of both sides of the game. A sensitivity analysis of the key parameters was conducted to explore the influence of each parameter on the evolution process and the stabilization trends. The study shows that (1) The time for the game system to reach a steady state is inversely related to the size of the initial willingness of the parties to cooperate. (2) In the mixed steady-state scenario, when the overall return differential between the positive and negative regulatory verification by government departments is positive, the steady state is participation and positive scrapping. (3) When the probability of the government verifying and being successful in verifying the punishment of the owner's negative scrapping behavior increases, both parties of the game will eventually choose the strategy of participation and positive scrapping. When the cost of the government participation strategy and the cost of the government verification strategy increase, both sides of the game will eventually choose the strategy combination of no participation and positive scrapping. (4) When the owner's reward for cooperating with the strategy, the owner's cost of scrapping the vehicle, and the benefits of the owner's negative cooperation strategy change, they will not change the strategy stability results but will affect the time it takes for the game system to reach a stable state. This study has theoretical implications for government policies in the scrapping industry and how to guide vehicle owners to actively scrap their vehicles.
在本文中，我们构建了一个博弈模型，以政府监管者和报废车所有者为主要参与者，运用演化博弈理论研究报废车的碳信用交易策略。利用 Matlab 仿真分析验证了结果，揭示了双方博弈策略的动态演变过程。对关键参数进行了敏感性分析，以探讨每个参数对演化过程和稳定趋势的影响。研究表明：（1）博弈系统达到稳定状态的时间与各方合作初始意愿的大小成反比。（2）在混合稳定状态下，当政府部门对正负监管验证的总体回报差异为正时，稳定状态是参与和正向报废。（3）当政府验证和成功验证所有者负面报废行为的惩罚的概率增加时，博弈的双方最终都会选择参与和正向报废的策略。当政府参与策略的成本和政府验证策略的成本增加时，博弈双方最终都会选择不参与和正向报废的策略组合。（4）当所有者与策略合作的奖励、所有者报废车辆的成本以及所有者负面合作策略的收益发生变化时，不会改变策略稳定性的结果，但会影响博弈系统达到稳定状态所需的时间。本研究对报废行业的政府政策以及如何引导车主积极报废车辆具有理论意义。
