School of Management, Shanghai University of Engineering Science, Shanghai 201620, China.
Department of Central Laboratory, Shanghai Children's Hospital, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200062, China.
Math Biosci Eng. 2021 Jul 28;18(5):6434-6451. doi: 10.3934/mbe.2021320.
Under the background of the aging population and the improvement of people's quality of life, the demand for household medical devices is expanding, which has huge market potential. However, the recycling of waste household medical devices has become a problem that must be faced by the market expansion. In order to reduce the environmental pollution caused by abandoned household medical devices, based on the dynamic punishment and dynamic subsidy measures adopted by the government, the evolutionary game model between the government and the household medical device enterprises is constructed. The strategic choice of the government and the domestic medical equipment enterprises is studied from the perspective of system dynamics. It is found that when the government adopts static measures, there is no stable equilibrium point in the game between the government and enterprises, while when the government adopts dynamic punishment or subsidies, there is a stable equilibrium point in the evolutionary game. In addition, the government can increase the penalty or reduce the subsidy to promote the probability of household medical device enterprises to choose recycling strategy and reduce environmental pollution.
在人口老龄化和人们生活质量提高的背景下，家庭医疗器械的需求不断扩大，具有巨大的市场潜力。然而，废旧家庭医疗器械的回收已经成为市场扩张必须面对的问题。为了减少废弃家庭医疗器械造成的环境污染，基于政府采取的动态惩罚和动态补贴措施，构建了政府和家庭医疗器械企业之间的演化博弈模型。从系统动力学的角度研究了政府和国内医疗器械企业的战略选择。结果发现，当政府采取静态措施时，政府与企业之间的博弈不存在稳定的平衡点，而当政府采取动态惩罚或补贴时，演化博弈存在稳定的平衡点。此外，政府可以增加惩罚或减少补贴，以提高家庭医疗器械企业选择回收策略的概率，减少环境污染。
