School of Economics and Management, Anqing Normal University, Anqing, China.
PLoS One. 2024 May 13;19(5):e0299086. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0299086. eCollection 2024.
Enhance performance in manufacturing carbon emission (MCE) reduction has become a widespread consensus and a necessary part, which cannot be achieved without the joint participation of manufacturing enterprises and supervisory departments. Accordingly, how to coordinate the interests of both sides and design a reasonable incentive-compatible mechanism becomes an urgent task at present. Considering the two subsidy funding channels of peer funds and government finance, this study applies the evolutionary game model to analyze feasible schemes for designing incentive-compatible mechanism of MCE supervision, discusses and simulates the realistic scenarios and influencing factors of incentive-compatible mechanism under the non-subsidized and subsidized schemes. The results show that MCE supervision is in an incentive-incompatible state under the non-subsidized incentive scheme, while in a constrained incentive-compatible state under the subsidized incentive scheme. With the increase of peer funds and penalty coefficient or the decrease of subsidy coefficient, the period of MCE supervision to reach an incentive-compatible state becomes shorter. However, a lower peer fund and penalty coefficient or a higher subsidy coefficient will contribute to a state of incentive-incompatible or a periodic cycle state of "incentive-compatible → incentive-incompatible →incentive-compatible→…" in the MCE supervision.
提高制造业碳排放（MCE）减排绩效已成为广泛共识和必要组成部分，这离不开制造企业和监管部门的共同参与。因此，如何协调双方利益并设计合理的激励相容机制成为当前的紧迫任务。考虑到同行资金和政府财政的两种补贴资金渠道，本研究应用演化博弈模型分析了设计 MCE 监管激励相容机制的可行方案，讨论并模拟了非补贴和补贴方案下激励相容机制的现实场景和影响因素。结果表明，在非补贴激励方案下，MCE 监管处于激励不相容状态，而在补贴激励方案下处于受约束的激励相容状态。随着同行资金和罚款系数的增加或补贴系数的降低，MCE 监管达到激励相容状态的时间周期会缩短。然而，较低的同行资金和罚款系数或较高的补贴系数将导致 MCE 监管处于激励不相容或“激励相容→激励不相容→激励相容→……”的周期性循环状态。
