Department of Personnel and Party Affairs, The First Affiliated Hospital with Nanjing Medical University, Nanjing, China.
Business School, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing, China.
Front Public Health. 2024 Feb 2;12:1325166. doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2024.1325166. eCollection 2024.
Currently in China, there is a lack of well-defined and viable incentive mechanisms at the governmental and hospital levels to support the development of young medical talents, thereby hindering their growth Existing studies primarily investigate the current state and trajectory of incentives, yet they inadequately address the distinctive characteristics of various stakeholders involved in medical talent incentive processes, particularly the lack of research on incentive mechanisms with Chinese attributes.
This study adopts evolutionary game theory to investigate the dynamics of replication and the strategies for achieving evolutionary stability in the comprehensive development of young medical talents, considering both scenarios with and without supportive policies.
In the absence of any supportive policy measures, the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) point is (0,0), the unstable equilibrium point is (1,1), and the saddle points are (0,1), (1,0). The initial state of the system is at the unstable equilibrium point (1,1), which means that the young medical talents and medical institutions adopt a combination of strategies (actively seeking comprehensive development and taking incentive measures). Under the scenario with supportive policies, the ESS point is (1,1), the unstable equilibrium point is (0,0), and the saddle points are (0,1), (1,0). The initial state of the system is at the unstable equilibrium point (0,0), which means that young medical talents and medical institutions adopt (,) strategy combinations (inactively seeking comprehensive development, implementing no incentive measure).
(1) Government incentives play a crucial role in motivating young medical talents to seek comprehensive development. (2) The level of government incentive support for young medical talents should exceed the cost increment of individual efforts. Additionally, the policy support provided by the government to medical institutions should surpass the incentive support offered by these institutions to young medical talents. This will enhance the motivation and encouragement efforts of medical institutions in actively promoting comprehensive development among young medical talents. (3) With the backing of certain government incentive policies, medical institutions implementing incentive measures and young medical talents actively seeking comprehensive development will establish a virtuous cycle of mutual promotion.
目前在中国，政府和医院层面缺乏明确且可行的激励机制来支持年轻医学人才的发展，从而阻碍了他们的成长。现有研究主要调查激励的现状和轨迹，但它们没有充分解决参与医学人才激励过程的不同利益相关者的独特特征，特别是缺乏对具有中国特色的激励机制的研究。
本研究采用进化博弈论来研究全面发展年轻医学人才的复制动态和实现进化稳定的策略，同时考虑有和没有支持政策的情况。
在没有任何支持政策措施的情况下，进化稳定策略（ESS）点是（0，0），不稳定平衡点是（1，1），鞍点是（0，1），（1，0）。系统的初始状态处于不稳定平衡点（1，1），这意味着年轻的医学人才和医疗机构采用了综合发展和激励措施的策略组合。在有支持政策的情况下，ESS 点是（1，1），不稳定平衡点是（0，0），鞍点是（0，1），（1，0）。系统的初始状态处于不稳定平衡点（0，0），这意味着年轻的医学人才和医疗机构采用了（不寻求综合发展，不实施激励措施）的策略组合。
（1）政府激励在激励年轻医学人才寻求全面发展方面起着至关重要的作用。（2）政府对年轻医学人才的激励支持水平应超过个人努力的成本增量。此外，政府向医疗机构提供的政策支持应超过医疗机构向年轻医学人才提供的激励支持。这将增强医疗机构积极促进年轻医学人才全面发展的激励和鼓励力度。（3）在一定的政府激励政策支持下，实施激励措施的医疗机构和积极寻求全面发展的年轻医学人才将建立相互促进的良性循环。
