Aravena-Rivas Yanela, Heilmann Anja, Watt Richard G, Broomhead Tom, Tsakos Georgios
Department of Epidemiology and Public Health, University College London, 1-19 Torrington Place, London, WC1E 7HB, UK.
Unit of Oral Health, Dentistry and Society, School of Clinical Dentistry, University of Sheffield, 19 Claremont Crescent, Sheffield, S10 2TA, UK.
Lancet Reg Health Am. 2024 Jun 9;35:100794. doi: 10.1016/j.lana.2024.100794. eCollection 2024 Jul.
Given the role of commercial determinants on sugar consumption and health, this study aimed to describe lobbying practices of the ultra-processed sugary food and drinks industries in Chile between 2014 and 2022.
Official meetings between ultra-processed sugary food and drinks industries and related commercial actors and Chilean government officials were obtained from the Chilean Lobby Registry. Relevant commercial names were initially identified based on their market share and expanded iteratively based on information from relevant meetings. Qualitative analysis followed a deductive-inductive approach using the Corporate Political Activity Model to identify and classify objectives, framing and action strategies.
From 237 records identified, the Ministries of Health, Social Development, and Economy were the most frequently lobbied. Industry representatives sought to achieve their short- and long-term objectives by targeting a diverse range of authorities, including Ministers and Under-secretaries, using different strategies. Framing strategies focused on presenting sugary food and drinks industries as socially responsible and legitimate policy actors and criticised public health initiatives as 'bad solutions'. Action strategies aimed to influence policymaking and nurture corporate reputations.
Extensive lobbying took place by the sugary food and drinks industries between 2014 and 2022, a period when major public health policies were being discussed in Chile. Lobbying strategies varied to meet industry objectives and targeted a diverse range of government institutions including high-ranking officials. Tighter regulations to stop inappropriate industry influence in public health policymaking are urgently required.
Agencia Nacional de Investigación y Desarrollo (Chile)-PhD Scholarship. University College London-Open Access fees.
鉴于商业因素对糖消费和健康的影响，本研究旨在描述2014年至2022年期间智利超加工含糖食品和饮料行业的游说行为。
从智利游说登记处获取超加工含糖食品和饮料行业与相关商业行为体及智利政府官员之间的官方会议记录。相关商业名称最初根据其市场份额确定，并根据相关会议信息进行迭代扩展。定性分析采用演绎-归纳法，运用企业政治活动模型来识别和分类目标、框架及行动策略。
从识别出的237条记录来看，卫生部、社会发展部和经济部是被游说最频繁的部门。行业代表试图通过针对包括部长和副部长在内的各级不同当局，运用不同策略来实现其短期和长期目标。框架策略侧重于将含糖食品和饮料行业呈现为具有社会责任感和合法的政策行为体，并将公共卫生举措批评为“糟糕的解决方案”。行动策略旨在影响政策制定并提升企业声誉。
2014年至2022年期间，含糖食品和饮料行业进行了广泛的游说活动，这一时期智利正在讨论重大公共卫生政策。游说策略各不相同，以满足行业目标，并针对包括高级官员在内的各级不同政府机构。迫切需要加强监管，以阻止该行业对公共卫生政策制定产生不当影响。
智利国家研究与发展署——博士奖学金。伦敦大学学院——开放获取费用。
