Value construction through sequential sampling explains serial dependencies in decision making.

Many decisions are expressed as a preference for one item over another. When these items are familiar, it is often assumed that the decision maker assigns a value to each of the items and chooses the item with the highest value. These values may be imperfectly recalled, but are assumed to be stable over the course of an interview or psychological experiment. Choices that are inconsistent with a stated valuation are thought to occur because of unspecified noise that corrupts the neural representation of value. Assuming that the noise is uncorrelated over time, the pattern of choices and response times in value-based decisions are modeled within the framework of Bounded Evidence Accumulation (BEA), similar to that used in perceptual decision-making. In BEA, noisy evidence samples accumulate over time until the accumulated evidence for one of the options reaches a threshold. Here, we argue that the assumption of temporally uncorrelated noise, while reasonable for perceptual decisions, is not reasonable for value-based decisions. Subjective values depend on the internal state of the decision maker, including their desires, needs, priorities, attentional state, and goals. These internal states may change over time, or undergo revaluation, as will the subjective values. We reasoned that these hypothetical value changes should be detectable in the pattern of choices made over a sequence of decisions. We reanalyzed data from a well-studied task in which participants were presented with pairs of snacks and asked to choose the one they preferred. Using a novel algorithm (), we show that the subjective value of the items changes significantly during a short experimental session (about 1 hour). Values derived with explain choice and response time better than explicitly stated values. They also better explain the BOLD signal in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, known to represent the value of decision alternatives. Revaluation is also observed in a BEA model in which successive evidence samples are not assumed to be independent. We argue that revaluation is a consequence of the process by which values are constructed during deliberation to resolve preference choices.