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政府在帮助中小企业获得融资方面的作用:一种演化博弈建模与仿真方法。

The role of government in helping SMEs to access finance: An evolutionary game modeling and simulation approach.

作者信息

Mei Zhu, Zhang Jingjing, Zhou QiaoMei

机构信息

School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhengjiang, Jiangsu Province, China.

School of Intellectual Property, Jiangsu University, Zhengjiang, Jiangsu Province, China.

出版信息

PLoS One. 2024 Dec 27;19(12):e0315941. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0315941. eCollection 2024.

DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0315941
PMID:39729504
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11676567/
Abstract

PURPOSE

This study aims to delineate the operating system of a strategic game model involving three core financial actors-government, banks, and guarantee institutions, with a focus on their collective impact on system evolution towards sustainable SME financing.

METHODOLOGY

Utilizing numerical simulations informed by dynamic equation constraints and optimal equilibrium states, this paper abstracts the strategic behaviors of system constituents, constructing a game model to predict and analyze system evolution within various operational contexts.

RESULTS

The simulation experiments reveal the critical role of quality risk information and responsible actor behavior in maintaining low default rates and fostering a sustainable financial system. System trajectories under various scenarios highlight the fragility of the equilibrium and the necessity of concerted, strategic cooperation among all stakeholders.

CONCLUSIONS

Findings underscore the importance of a cooperative, conscientious approach by government, banks, and guarantee institutions to ensure a robust and sustainable SME financing environment. The study advocates for strategic policy guidance, emphasizing the interconnectedness of institutional roles and their cumulative effect on system stability.

摘要

目的

本研究旨在描绘一个涉及政府、银行和担保机构这三个核心金融行为主体的战略博弈模型的运行机制,重点关注它们对中小企业可持续融资系统演化的集体影响。

方法

本文利用由动态方程约束和最优均衡状态所指导的数值模拟,抽象出系统组成部分的战略行为,构建一个博弈模型来预测和分析不同运营环境下的系统演化。

结果

模拟实验揭示了质量风险信息和责任行为主体的行为在维持低违约率和促进可持续金融系统方面的关键作用。各种情景下的系统轨迹凸显了均衡的脆弱性以及所有利益相关者协同战略合作的必要性。

结论

研究结果强调了政府、银行和担保机构采取合作、尽责方法以确保稳健和可持续的中小企业融资环境的重要性。该研究倡导战略政策指导,强调机构角色的相互关联性及其对系统稳定性的累积影响。

https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/6ec9/11676567/cb0fa74cebd6/pone.0315941.g011.jpg
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