Sun Mengxin, Huang Xianggang
School of Economics and Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou, China.
PLoS One. 2025 May 7;20(5):e0322411. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0322411. eCollection 2025.
Amid the push for green transformation and industrial upgrades, how heavily polluting enterprises achieve green transition has become a focal point for the government and society. In response to policy demands, these enterprises often pursue green mergers as a means of transformation, though under varying conditions, they may opt for either green mergers or greenwashing, raising questions about their motivations. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a four-party game model involving the media, government, public, and enterprises to analyze strategy stability. Using Lyapunov's first law, this paper examine the stability of equilibrium points, investigating how factors like media transparency, regulatory strength, and public discernment affect corporate decisions. The findings show that: 1) corporate green mergers are significantly influenced by media authenticity, government oversight, and public discernment; 2) media and public supervision play crucial roles in curbing greenwashing. Based on these insights, we propose strengthening media supervision, optimizing regulatory policies, and enhancing public environmental awareness to promote green mergers.
在推动绿色转型和产业升级的背景下，重污染企业如何实现绿色转型已成为政府和社会关注的焦点。为响应政策要求，这些企业常将绿色并购作为转型手段，不过在不同情况下，它们可能选择绿色并购，也可能进行漂绿行为，这引发了对其动机的质疑。基于演化博弈理论，本文构建了一个包含媒体、政府、公众和企业的四方博弈模型，以分析策略稳定性。运用李雅普诺夫第一定律，本文考察均衡点的稳定性，探究媒体透明度、监管力度和公众辨别力等因素如何影响企业决策。研究结果表明：1）企业绿色并购受媒体真实性、政府监管和公众辨别力的显著影响；2）媒体和公众监督在遏制漂绿行为方面发挥着关键作用。基于这些见解，我们建议加强媒体监督、优化监管政策并提高公众环保意识，以促进绿色并购。
