Gangemi Amelia, Rizzotto Chiara, Riggio Febronia, Dahò Margherita, Mancini Francesco
Department of Cognitive Sciences (COSPECS), University of Messina, Messina, Italy.
Department of Psychology, Educational Science and Human Movement (SPPEFF), University of Palermo, Palermo, Italy.
Front Psychol. 2025 Mar 28;16:1518752. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2025.1518752. eCollection 2025.
This paper examines the impact of moral emotions, such as guilt, on decisions under risk. In two experiments, we demonstrated that guilt emotion influences preferences for risky and riskless choices, depending on the subject's moral goal, i.e., reparation or expiation, whereas anger consistently elicits a preference for taking risks. Unlike other moral emotions (e.g., anger), guilt is thus not characterized by a fixed preference for either risky or riskless choices. Preferences vary as a function of the option that may satisfy the moral goal, instead of by a form of bias that the different emotions play toward decisions under risk. Finally, in both experiments, responses appear to be based on the framing of the decision problem according to the induced emotional state (guilt or anger), rather than on the descriptions of the outcomes as given in the options (gain-loss framing effect).
本文探讨了诸如内疚等道德情绪对风险决策的影响。在两项实验中，我们证明，内疚情绪会影响对风险和无风险选择的偏好，这取决于主体的道德目标，即补偿或赎罪，而愤怒则始终引发冒险偏好。因此，与其他道德情绪（如愤怒）不同，内疚的特点不是对有风险或无风险选择有固定偏好。偏好会随着可能满足道德目标的选项而变化，而不是取决于不同情绪对风险决策所起的某种偏差形式。最后，在两项实验中，反应似乎基于根据诱发的情绪状态（内疚或愤怒）对决策问题的框架构建，而不是基于选项中给出的结果描述（得失框架效应）。
