Harré R
Br J Med Psychol. 1984 Jun;57(2):127-35. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-8341.1984.tb01591.x.
The assumption that 'mind' is the product of individual development and that cognition and emotion must be sited in individual people has dominated psychology until recently. The new conception of a 'social construction of mind' is grounded in the idea that an interpersonal conversation is the fundamental psychological reality, and that individual minds are appropriations from it. Such a personal mind is created by making private what is originally and primarily public. This idea strikes at the Cartesian basis of both behaviourist and non-behaviourist psychology, suggesting a more complex multidimensional set of polar oppositions for defining the problems of scientific psychology. For example, perhaps knowledge should be studied as a collective resource rather than as individual beliefs. There is evidence from anthropology that even that intimate form of cognitive organization we call the 'self' may have social origins in favoured grammatical models and so may be expected to differ from one linguistic culture to another.
直到最近，“心智”是个体发展的产物，认知和情感必定存在于个体之中这一假设一直主导着心理学。“心智的社会建构”这一新概念基于这样一种观点，即人际对话是基本的心理现实，而个体心智是从中衍生而来的。这样一种个人心智是通过将原本主要是公共的东西私密化而形成的。这一观点冲击了行为主义和非行为主义心理学的笛卡尔基础，为界定科学心理学问题提出了一组更为复杂的多维两极对立。例如，或许知识应作为一种集体资源而非个体信念来研究。人类学的证据表明，甚至我们称为“自我”的那种亲密的认知组织形式，在偏好的语法模式中可能也有社会根源，因此有望因语言文化的不同而有所差异。
