Johnson C N, Wellman H M
Child Dev. 1982 Feb;53(1):222-34.
Previous investigators have examined children's knowledge about particular cognitive performances such as metamemory, or particular mental acts, such as dreams. The present research adds a new dimension by considering children's concepts of the mind as a whole. The development of concepts of both the mind and brain is examined in subjects from preschool age through adulthood. Evidence is presented to show that by ages 4 and 5 years children commonly regard the brain as an internal mindlike entity associated with a class of distinctly mental acts. This runs counter to previous characterizations of young children as failing to distinguish mental from overt behavioral acts. Young children begin with undifferentiated conceptions of the mind and brain. Both entities are regarded as necessary for mental, but not sensory-motor actions. In subsequent developments, the concepts of the mind and brain are differentiated along 2 lines. Ontologically, the mind is distinguished by its immateriality; functionally, the brain is distinguished by its involvement in bodily actions. The development of knowledge about the brain is discussed with respect to acquiring "popular" and "technical" definitions. The results are regarded as contributing toward understanding how children come to organize information about the mental world as a whole.
以往的研究者考察了儿童关于特定认知表现（如元记忆）或特定心理行为（如梦）的知识。本研究通过将儿童对心智的概念作为一个整体来考量，增添了一个新的维度。研究考察了从学龄前到成年的受试者关于心智和大脑概念的发展。有证据表明，4到5岁的儿童通常将大脑视为与一类明显的心理行为相关的内在的、类似心智的实体。这与之前将幼儿描述为无法区分心理行为和公开行为的特征相悖。幼儿最初对心智和大脑的概念是未分化的。这两个实体都被认为是心理行为所必需的，但不是感觉运动行为所必需的。在随后的发展中，心智和大脑的概念沿着两条线分化。在本体论上，心智因其非物质性而有别于其他；在功能上，大脑因其参与身体行为而有别于其他。关于大脑的知识发展是从获得“通俗”和“专业”定义的角度来讨论的。这些结果被认为有助于理解儿童是如何开始将关于心理世界的信息作为一个整体进行组织的。
