Sedikides C
Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 27599-3270, USA.
J Pers Soc Psychol. 1995 Oct;69(4):759-77. doi: 10.1037//0022-3514.69.4.759.
This article proposes a differential sensitivity hypothesis, according to which central (i.e., relatively high in personal descriptiveness and importance) and peripheral (i.e., relatively low in personal descriptiveness and importance) self-conceptions are differentially influenced by mood: Peripheral self-conceptions are subject to a mood-congruency bias, whereas central self-conceptions are unaffected by mood. In 4 experiments, participants were first placed into a sad, neutral, or happy mood state through a guided imagery task and later completed behavior self-descriptiveness ratings, trait self-descriptiveness ratings, and trait self-descriptiveness judgmental latencies. Strong support for the differential sensitivity hypothesis was obtained. Peripheral self-conceptions were influenced by mood because they were less elaborated and consolidated and were held with lower certainty, thus increasing the likelihood for the occurrence of constructive, affect-infusing processes (J.P. Forgas, 1995a).
本文提出了一种差异敏感性假设,根据该假设,核心(即个人描述性和重要性相对较高)和边缘(即个人描述性和重要性相对较低)自我概念受到情绪的影响不同:边缘自我概念受到情绪一致性偏差的影响,而核心自我概念不受情绪影响。在4个实验中,参与者首先通过引导性意象任务被置于悲伤、中性或快乐情绪状态,随后完成行为自我描述性评分、特质自我描述性评分以及特质自我描述性判断潜伏期。该差异敏感性假设得到了有力支持。边缘自我概念受到情绪影响,因为它们的阐述和巩固程度较低,且持有确定性较低,从而增加了建设性、情感注入过程发生的可能性(J.P. 福加斯,1995a)。