Gillett G
Bioethics Centre University of Otago Medical School, Dunedin, New Zealand.
J Med Philos. 1995 Jun;20(3):285-98. doi: 10.1093/jmp/20.3.285.
Since the time of Hippocrates, medical science sought to develop a practice based on "knowledge rather than opinion". However, in the light of recent alternative approaches to healing and a philosophy of science that, through thinkers like Kuhn, Rorty, and Foucault, is critical of claims to objective truth, we must reappraise the way in which medical interventions can be based on proven pathophysiological knowledge rather than opinion. Developing insights in Foucault, Lacan, and Wittgenstein, this essay argues for a recovery of the Aristotelian idea of a techne, where there is a dynamic interplay between praxis and conceptualization. The result is a post-Kuhnian epistemology for medical science that recognizes the evaluative dimension of knowledge, but that also looks to a Platonic conception of the good as the ultimate constraint on human thought, thus avoiding the radically self-contained accounts of truth found in some post-modern thinkers.
自希波克拉底时代起，医学就试图发展一种基于“知识而非观点”的实践。然而，鉴于近期出现的替代治疗方法以及一种科学哲学（通过库恩、罗蒂和福柯等思想家）对客观真理主张的批判，我们必须重新评估医学干预基于已证实的病理生理知识而非观点的方式。通过对福柯、拉康和维特根斯坦的深入洞察，本文主张恢复亚里士多德的技艺概念，即实践与概念化之间存在动态相互作用。结果是为医学科学构建了一种后库恩认识论，它既承认知识的评价维度，又将柏拉图式的善的概念视为对人类思想的最终约束，从而避免了一些后现代思想家那种完全自足的真理观。
