Zweighaft R M, Fraser D W, Hattwick M A, Winkler W G, Jordan W C, Alter M, Wolfe M, Wulff H, Johnson K M
N Engl J Med. 1977 Oct 13;297(15):803-7. doi: 10.1056/NEJM197710132971504.
In February, 1976, a Peace Corps worker returned to the United States from Sierra Leone with an undiagnosed illness later recognized as Lassa fever. To assess the risk of transmission and to contain a potential outbreak, we identified 552 contacts as having had exposure to the patient before the start of strict isolation procedures, and maintained intensive surveillance on these contacts for 21 days. At the end of the surveillance period, no illness had developed in contacts. One month later, a serologic survey among 29 of the contacts judged to be at high risk gave no evidence of infection. In response to the importation of this communicable and highly fatal disease, procedures for the isolation of the patient, the identification, surveillance and management of contacts and the handling of laboratory specimens were developed and implemented. These procedures could be adapted to future introductions of highly contagious diseases.
1976年2月,一名和平队工作人员从塞拉利昂返回美国,身患一种当时未确诊的疾病,后来被确认为拉沙热。为评估传播风险并控制可能的疫情爆发,我们确定552名接触者在严格隔离程序开始前曾接触过该患者,并对这些接触者进行了为期21天的强化监测。在监测期结束时,接触者中无人发病。一个月后,对29名被判定为高风险的接触者进行的血清学调查未发现感染迹象。针对这种传染性强且致命的疾病的输入,制定并实施了患者隔离、接触者识别、监测和管理以及实验室标本处理的程序。这些程序可适用于未来高传染性疾病的传入。