Choi Mary J, Worku Shewangizaw, Knust Barbara, Vang Arnold, Lynfield Ruth, Mount Mark R, Objio Tina, Brown Shelley, Griffith Jayne, Hulbert Deborah, Lippold Susan, Ervin Elizabeth, Ströher Ute, Holzbauer Stacy, Slattery Wendolyn, Washburn Faith, Harper Jane, Koeck Mackenzie, Uher Carol, Rollin Pierre, Nichol Stuart, Else Ryan, DeVries Aaron
Minnesota Department of Health, St. Paul, Minnesota.
Mercy Hospital, Allina Health, Coon Rapids, Minnesota.
Open Forum Infect Dis. 2018 Jul 16;5(7):ofy131. doi: 10.1093/ofid/ofy131. eCollection 2018 Jul.
In April 2014, a 46-year-old returning traveler from Liberia was transported by emergency medical services to a community hospital in Minnesota with fever and altered mental status. Twenty-four hours later, he developed gingival bleeding. Blood samples tested positive for Lassa fever RNA by reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction.
Blood and urine samples were obtained from the patient and tested for evidence of Lassa fever virus infection. Hospital infection control personnel and health department personnel reviewed infection control practices with health care personnel. In addition to standard precautions, infection control measures were upgraded to include contact, droplet, and airborne precautions. State and federal public health officials conducted contract tracing activities among family contacts, health care personnel, and fellow airline travelers.
The patient was discharged from the hospital after 14 days. However, his recovery was complicated by the development of near complete bilateral sensorineural hearing loss. Lassa virus RNA continued to be detected in his urine for several weeks after hospital discharge. State and federal public health authorities identified and monitored individuals who had contact with the patient while he was ill. No secondary cases of Lassa fever were identified among 75 contacts.
Given the nonspecific presentation of viral hemorrhagic fevers, isolation of ill travelers and consistent implementation of basic infection control measures are key to preventing secondary transmission. When consistently applied, these measures can prevent secondary transmission even if travel history information is not obtained, not immediately available, or the diagnosis of a viral hemorrhagic fever is delayed.
2014年4月,一名从利比里亚回国的46岁旅行者因发热和精神状态改变,被紧急医疗服务部门送往明尼苏达州的一家社区医院。24小时后,他出现牙龈出血。血液样本经逆转录聚合酶链反应检测,拉沙热RNA呈阳性。
采集患者的血液和尿液样本,检测是否有拉沙热病毒感染的证据。医院感染控制人员和卫生部门人员与医护人员一起审查了感染控制措施。除标准预防措施外,感染控制措施升级为包括接触、飞沫和空气传播预防措施。州和联邦公共卫生官员对家庭接触者、医护人员和同机旅客进行了接触者追踪活动。
患者14天后出院。然而,他的康复因几乎完全双侧感音神经性听力丧失而变得复杂。出院后数周,其尿液中仍持续检测到拉沙病毒RNA。州和联邦公共卫生当局识别并监测了患者患病期间与之接触的人员。75名接触者中未发现拉沙热二代病例。
鉴于病毒性出血热的表现不具特异性,隔离患病旅行者并持续实施基本感染控制措施是预防二代传播的关键。如果持续应用,即使未获取旅行史信息、旅行史信息无法立即获取或病毒性出血热的诊断延迟,这些措施也能预防二代传播。