Dalla Barba G
U. 324 INSERM, Paris, France.
Memory. 1997 Nov;5(6):657-72. doi: 10.1080/741941546.
The phenomenal experience that accompanies the recognition of a previously presented stimulus seems to take at least two distinct forms. Recognition can occur when the stimulus evokes some specific experience in which the stimulus was previously involved, or, alternatively, when the stimulus gives rise only to feeling of familiarity without any recollective experience. These two kinds of conscious awareness can be measured in laboratory conditions by "remember" and "know" responses. A "remember" response indicates that recognising the stimulus brings back to mind some conscious recollection of its prior occurrence, whereas a "know" response indicates that recognising the stimulus is not accompanied by any conscious recollection of its prior occurrence. In the experiments reported here the relationship between recognition memory and conscious experience in Alzheimer's disease (AD) patients was investigated. The purpose of the experiments was to compare "remember" measures of conscious awareness in free recognition and forced-choice recognition memory for words and unfamiliar faces. The point of the experiments was to see whether AD patients' performance might be associated with a decrease in the relative incidence of "remember" responses as compared to normal controls (NC), and whether there was an effect of experimental material (words versus faces) on recognition performance and on recollective experience. In both experiments AD patients produced significantly fewer correct responses and fewer "remember" responses for correctly recognised items than NC. By contrast AD patients produced the same proportion of "know" responses to target items as compared to NC in all recognition conditions, with the exception of forced-choice recognition of faces where they gave more "know" responses to target faces than NC. These results are consistent with the assumption that recognition memory may entail two processes, only one of which gives rise to conscious recollection, and they suggest that an impairment of conscious recollection is responsible for the poor performance of AD patients in recognition memory. Implications of these findings for current theories of retrieval are discussed.
对先前呈现的刺激的识别所伴随的现象学体验似乎至少有两种不同的形式。当刺激唤起某种先前涉及该刺激的特定体验时,或者当刺激仅产生熟悉感而没有任何回忆体验时,识别就会发生。这两种意识觉知可以在实验室条件下通过“记得”和“知道”反应来测量。“记得”反应表明识别该刺激会唤起对其先前出现的一些有意识的回忆,而“知道”反应表明识别该刺激时没有对其先前出现的任何有意识的回忆。在本文报道的实验中,研究了阿尔茨海默病(AD)患者的识别记忆与意识体验之间的关系。实验的目的是比较在自由识别和对单词及陌生面孔的强制选择识别记忆中意识觉知的“记得”测量。实验的要点是看AD患者的表现是否可能与“记得”反应的相对发生率相较于正常对照组(NC)的降低有关,以及实验材料(单词与面孔)对识别表现和回忆体验是否有影响。在两个实验中,AD患者对正确识别的项目产生的正确反应和“记得”反应都明显少于NC。相比之下,在所有识别条件下,AD患者对目标项目产生的“知道”反应比例与NC相同,但在对面孔的强制选择识别中,他们对目标面孔的“知道”反应比NC更多。这些结果与识别记忆可能需要两个过程的假设一致,其中只有一个过程会产生有意识的回忆,并且它们表明有意识回忆的受损是AD患者在识别记忆中表现不佳的原因。讨论了这些发现对当前提取理论的影响。