Goff L M, Roediger H L
Washington University, St. Louis, MO 63130-4899, USA.
Mem Cognit. 1998 Jan;26(1):20-33. doi: 10.3758/bf03211367.
In two experiments, subjects heard simple action statements (e.g., "Break the toothpick"), and, in some conditions, they also performed the action or imagined performing the action. In a second session that occurred at a later point (10 min, 24 h, 1 week, or 2 weeks later), subjects imagined performing actions one, three, or five times. Some imagined actions represented statements heard, imagined, or performed in the first session, whereas other statements were new in the second session. During a third (test) phase, subjects were instructed to recognize statements only if they had occurred during the first session and, if recognized, to tell whether the action statement had been carried out, imagined, or merely heard. The primary finding was that increasing the number of imaginings during the second session caused subjects to remember later that they had performed an action during the first session when in fact they had not (imagination inflation). This outcome occurred both for statements that subjects had heard but not performed during the first session and for statements that had never been heard during the first session. The results are generally consistent with Johnson, Hashtroudi, and Lindsay's (1993) source monitoring framework and reveal a powerful memory illusion: Imagining performance of an action can cause its recollection as actually having been carried out.
在两项实验中,受试者听到简单的动作陈述(例如,“折断牙签”),并且在某些情况下,他们还执行了该动作或想象执行该动作。在稍后的第二个阶段(10分钟、24小时、1周或2周后),受试者想象执行动作一、三或五次。一些想象的动作代表在第一阶段听到、想象或执行的陈述,而其他陈述在第二阶段是新的。在第三个(测试)阶段,受试者被指示仅识别在第一阶段出现过的陈述,如果识别出来,要说出动作陈述是已经执行、想象过还是仅仅听过。主要发现是,在第二阶段增加想象的次数会导致受试者后来记住他们在第一阶段执行了一个动作,而实际上他们并没有(想象膨胀)。对于受试者在第一阶段听过但未执行的陈述以及在第一阶段从未听过的陈述,都出现了这种结果。这些结果总体上与约翰逊、哈什特鲁迪和林赛(1993年)的源监测框架一致,并揭示了一种强大的记忆错觉:想象执行一个动作会导致将其回忆为实际已经执行过。