Yáñez Cortés R J
Acta Psiquiatr Psicol Am Lat. 1976 Jun;22(2):98-106.
The author contends that the constitution of Psychology as a Science requires the elucidation of the conceptual instruments to be used in the approach of its specific theoretical object. In order to meet that requirement, three main methodological subjects are considered: I. The image, conceived as embodiment of the illusory and the deceptive, vs. the image as "the imaginary". Images are defined as representations determined a priori as the sole possibility of understanding reality. The distinction is made between two modes of this gnoseological process: the one, apparent, the other real. The first one, image as a representation having no correspondence whatsoever with reality, conveys only deceptive features: illusion at the individual level, and ideology at the broader scale of the socioeconomical class. Illusion and ideology are subject to parallel in that both mask reality, uncovering a part of it in order to hide the whole; and they imply each other in that to each illusion of individual consciousness corresponds a single socio-economical ideology. The unmasking must be performed both at the individual (illusion) and the collective (ideology) levels, through a conceptual work under a clear conception of knowledge and its methods, leading to an actually objectivating neutral act-Husserl. II. The imaginary as a project of irreality. Accepting that the image has a double function: a) an essential (gnoseological) one, and b) an unesential, supplementary one, as the support of illusion and ideology, there is yet a double manner for the concealment: a) subjective or belonging to the psychological level, and b) objective-intersubjective level, or actual social level. The image provides the object for the "belief", being thus the basis for the creation of a super-reality, an invention over another invention, with the goal of fulfilling desire. This goal implies failure in itself, as desire is always beyond the reality that seeks its fulfillment. The process of illusion can be explained by the triple link: desire-imagination-illusion, leading to belief. In desire there is a double work: a) a positive one, or trend towards the appropriation of the object; and b) a negative one, or the all-present frustration leading, precisely, to illusion. III. Desire and discourse: dialectics of possibility. Reality provides a limit-border to desire: it sets the frontiers of impossibility. Only the discourse provides a program, a planification of the being-desire. But desire exceeds the limits of possibility, and sets the underlying framework on which the impossibility of desire is expressed. Two different answers have been attempted from a logical-gnoseological-methodological stand point, consisting of reductionisms or pseudo-answers. Firstly, intellectualism, professing to reduce everything to rational cathegories and their logico-formal methods; and secondly, naturalism, professing to reduce everything to a factic-empirical scheme and to its experimental method...
作者认为,心理学作为一门科学的构建需要阐明在研究其特定理论对象时所使用的概念工具。为满足这一要求,考虑了三个主要的方法论主题:一、被视为虚幻和欺骗之体现的形象,与作为“想象之物”的形象相对。形象被定义为先天确定的表征,是理解现实的唯一可能性。在这种认识论过程的两种模式之间做出了区分:一种是表面的,另一种是真实的。第一种,即与现实毫无对应关系的形象表征,仅传达欺骗性特征:个体层面的幻觉,以及社会经济阶层更广泛层面的意识形态。幻觉和意识形态是并行的,因为两者都掩盖现实,揭示其中一部分以隐藏整体;它们相互暗示,因为个体意识的每一种幻觉都对应着一种单一的社会经济意识形态。必须通过在清晰理解知识及其方法的基础上进行的概念性工作,在个体(幻觉)和集体(意识形态)层面进行揭露,从而导致一种真正客观化的中立行为——胡塞尔。二、作为非现实投射的想象之物。承认形象具有双重功能:a)本质(认识论)功能,以及b)非本质的、补充性的功能,作为幻觉和意识形态的支撑,然而存在两种隐藏方式:a)主观的或属于心理层面的,以及b)客观的主体间层面或实际社会层面的。形象为“信仰”提供对象,因此是创造超现实的基础,一种基于另一种发明的发明,目的是满足欲望。这个目标本身就意味着失败,因为欲望总是超出寻求满足的现实。幻觉的过程可以用欲望 - 想象 - 幻觉的三重联系来解释,从而导致信仰。在欲望中有双重作用:a)积极的作用,即趋向于占有对象的趋势;以及b)消极的作用,即始终存在的挫折感,恰恰导致幻觉。三、欲望与话语:可能性的辩证法。现实为欲望设定了界限:它划定了不可能的边界。只有话语提供了一个程序,一种对欲望存在的规划。但欲望超越了可能性的界限,并设定了欲望不可能性得以表达的潜在框架。从逻辑 - 认识论 - 方法论的角度尝试了两种不同的答案,它们由还原论或伪答案组成。首先是理智主义,声称将一切都还原为理性范畴及其逻辑 - 形式方法;其次是自然主义,声称将一切都还原为事实 - 经验模式及其实验方法……