Loewenstein G F, Weber E U, Hsee C K, Welch N
Department of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213-3890, USA.
Psychol Bull. 2001 Mar;127(2):267-86. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.127.2.267.
Virtually all current theories of choice under risk or uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist. They assume that people assess the desirability and likelihood of possible outcomes of choice alternatives and integrate this information through some type of expectation-based calculus to arrive at a decision. The authors propose an alternative theoretical perspective, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, that highlights the role of affect experienced at the moment of decision making. Drawing on research from clinical, physiological, and other subfields of psychology, they show that emotional reactions to risky situations often diverge from cognitive assessments of those risks. When such divergence occurs, emotional reactions often drive behavior. The risk-as-feelings hypothesis is shown to explain a wide range of phenomena that have resisted interpretation in cognitive-consequentialist terms.
几乎所有当前关于风险或不确定性下选择的理论都是认知性的和结果主义的。它们假定人们评估选择方案可能结果的可取性和可能性，并通过某种基于期望的计算来整合这些信息，从而做出决策。作者提出了一种替代性的理论视角，即风险即感受假说，该假说强调了决策时刻所体验到的情感的作用。借鉴临床、生理和心理学其他子领域的研究，他们表明，对风险情境的情绪反应往往与对这些风险的认知评估不一致。当这种不一致出现时，情绪反应往往会驱动行为。风险即感受假说被证明可以解释一系列难以用认知结果主义术语来解释的现象。
