Lambie John A, Marcel Anthony J
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge and De Montfort University, England.
Psychol Rev. 2002 Apr;109(2):219-59. doi: 10.1037/0033-295x.109.2.219.
Data reviewed suggest that previous theories of emotion experience are too narrow in scope and that lack of consensus is due to the fact that emotion experience takes various forms and is heterogenous. The authors treat separately the content of emotion experience, the underlying nonconscious correspondences, and processes producing emotion experience. They classify the nature and content of emotion experience and propose that it depends on 3 aspects of attention: mode (analytic-synthetic; detached-immersed), direction (self-world), and focus (evaluation-action). The account is informed by a 2-level view of consciousness in which phenomenology (1st order) is distinguished from awareness (2nd order). These distinctions enable the authors to differentiate and account for cases of "unconscious" emotion, in which there is an apparent lack of phenomenology or awareness.
所审查的数据表明，先前关于情绪体验的理论在范围上过于狭窄，缺乏共识的原因在于情绪体验具有多种形式且是异质的。作者分别探讨了情绪体验的内容、潜在的无意识对应关系以及产生情绪体验的过程。他们对情绪体验的性质和内容进行了分类，并提出情绪体验取决于注意力的三个方面：模式（分析 - 综合；超脱 - 沉浸）、方向（自我 - 世界）和焦点（评估 - 行动）。该论述基于意识的二级观点，其中现象学（一阶）与觉知（二阶）有所区分。这些区分使作者能够区分并解释“无意识”情绪的情况，即明显缺乏现象学或觉知的情况。
