Bayne Tim, Kolers Avery
Department of Philosophy, Macquarie Univesity, North Ryde, NSW 2109, Australia.
Bioethics. 2003 Jun;17(3):221-42. doi: 10.1111/1467-8519.00338.
What is it that makes someone a parent? Many writers--call them 'monists'--claim that parenthood is grounded solely in one essential feature that is both necessary and sufficient for someone's being a parent. We reject not only monism but also 'necessity' views, in which some specific feature is necessary but not also sufficient for parenthood. Our argument supports what we call 'pluralism', the view that any one of several kinds of relationship is sufficient for parenthood. We begin by challenging monistic versions of gestationalism, the view that gestation uniquely grounds parenthood. Monistic and necessity gestationalism are implausible. First, we raise the 'paternity problem'--necessity gestationalists lack an adequate account of how men become fathers. Second, the positive arguments that necessity gestationalists give are not compelling. However, although gestation may not be a necessary condition for parenthood, there is not good reason to think that it is sufficient. After further rebutting an 'intentionalist' account of parenthood, in which having and acting on intentions to procreate and rear is necessary for parenthood, we end by sketching a pluralistic picture of the nature of parenthood, rooted in causation, on which gestation, direct genetic derivation, extended custody, and even, sometimes, intentions, may be individually sufficient for parenthood.
是什么让一个人成为父母？许多作家——称他们为“一元论者”——声称父母身份完全基于一个基本特征，这个特征对某人成为父母来说既是必要的也是充分的。我们不仅反对一元论，也反对“必要性”观点，即某些特定特征对父母身份来说是必要的但不是充分的。我们的论点支持我们所说的“多元论”，即几种关系中的任何一种对父母身份来说都是充分的这一观点。我们首先挑战妊娠主义的一元论版本，即认为妊娠是父母身份的唯一基础这一观点。一元论和必要性妊娠主义是不合理的。首先，我们提出“父亲身份问题”——必要性妊娠主义者缺乏对男性如何成为父亲的充分解释。其次，必要性妊娠主义者给出的正面论据并不令人信服。然而，尽管妊娠可能不是成为父母的必要条件，但也没有充分理由认为它是充分条件。在进一步反驳了一种关于父母身份的“意向主义”解释（即生育和抚养的意图及付诸行动对成为父母来说是必要的）之后，我们最后勾勒出一幅关于父母身份本质的多元图景，它植根于因果关系，在这幅图景中，妊娠、直接基因衍生、长期监护，甚至有时意图，可能各自对成为父母来说都是充分的。
