Webby Richard J, Webster Robert G
Division of Virology, Department of Infectious Diseases, St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, 332 North Lauderdale, Memphis, TN 38105, USA.
Science. 2003 Nov 28;302(5650):1519-22. doi: 10.1126/science.1090350.
During the past year, the public has become keenly aware of the threat of emerging infectious diseases with the global spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), the continuing threat of bioterrorism, the proliferation of West Nile virus, and the discovery of human cases of monkeypox in the United States. At the same time, an old foe has again raised its head, reminding us that our worst nightmare may not be a new one. In 2003, highly pathogenic strains of avian influenza virus, including the H5N1 and H7N7 subtypes, again crossed from birds to humans and caused fatal disease. Direct avian-to-human influenza transmission was unknown before 1997. Have we responded to these threats by better preparing for emerging disease agents, or are we continuing to act only as crises arise? Here we consider progress to date in preparedness for an influenza pandemic and review what remains to be done. We conclude by prioritizing the remaining needs and exploring the reasons for our current lack of preparedness for an influenza pandemic.
在过去的一年里,随着严重急性呼吸综合征(SARS)在全球蔓延、生物恐怖主义威胁持续存在、西尼罗河病毒扩散以及美国发现人类感染猴痘病例,公众已经敏锐地意识到新出现的传染病所带来的威胁。与此同时,一个老对手再次抬头,提醒我们最可怕的噩梦可能并非新出现的事物。2003年,高致病性禽流感病毒株,包括H5N1和H7N7亚型,再次从禽类传播给人类并导致致命疾病。1997年之前,禽类直接向人类传播流感是未知的。我们是通过更好地为新出现的病原体做准备来应对这些威胁,还是仍然只在危机出现时才采取行动?在这里,我们考虑到目前为止在防范流感大流行方面取得的进展,并回顾仍有待完成的工作。我们通过确定剩余需求的优先级并探究当前缺乏流感大流行防范措施的原因来得出结论。