Hester D Micah
Mercer University School of Medicine, Macon, GA 31207-0001, USA.
J Med Philos. 2003 Oct-Dec;28(5-6):545-61. doi: 10.1076/jmep.28.5.545.18820.
This paper attempts to defend pragmatic approaches to bioethics against detractors, showing how particular critics have failed or succeeded. The paper divides bioethics from a pragmatic point of view into three groups. The first group is called "bioethical pragmatism" that will be represented by two book-chapters from the anthology, Pragmatic Bioethics. The second group is called "clinical pragmatism" championed by Fins, Baccetta, and Miller. Finally, a third group, which has roots in the legal tradition, has been called "freestanding pragmatism" and is portrayed by Grey, Posner, and Wolf. Each group has been criticized in journal articles, and, in turn, this paper critiques some of the (mis)understandings put forth by Tollefsen, Jansen, and Arras about the capabilities and status of pragmatism in bioethical discussions. Finally, it concludes with cautionary notes about pragmatic bioethics in hopes that pragmatists will learn from their own insights about the human condition and the discipline of bioethics.
本文试图为生物伦理学的实用主义方法辩护，以回应批评者，展示特定批评者的成败之处。从实用主义角度出发，本文将生物伦理学分为三类。第一类称为“生物伦理实用主义”，将以论文集《实用生物伦理学》中的两章内容为代表。第二类称为“临床实用主义”，由芬斯、巴切塔和米勒倡导。最后，第三类源于法律传统，被称为“独立实用主义”，由格雷、波斯纳和沃尔夫阐述。每一类在期刊文章中都受到了批评，反过来，本文也对托勒夫森、扬森和阿拉斯在生物伦理讨论中对实用主义的能力和地位提出的一些（错误）理解进行了批判。最后，文章以对实用主义生物伦理学的警示性言论作结，希望实用主义者能从他们对人类状况和生物伦理学科的见解中吸取教训。
