Barrett Jonathan, Hardy Lucien, Kent Adrian
Physique Théorique, Université Libre de Bruxelles, CP 225, Boulevard du Triomphe, 1050 Bruxelles, Belgium.
Phys Rev Lett. 2005 Jul 1;95(1):010503. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.95.010503. Epub 2005 Jun 27.
Standard quantum key distribution protocols are provably secure against eavesdropping attacks, if quantum theory is correct. It is theoretically interesting to know if we need to assume the validity of quantum theory to prove the security of quantum key distribution, or whether its security can be based on other physical principles. The question would also be of practical interest if quantum mechanics were ever to fail in some regime, because a scientifically and technologically advanced eavesdropper could perhaps use postquantum physics to extract information from quantum communications without necessarily causing the quantum state disturbances on which existing security proofs rely. Here we describe a key distribution scheme provably secure against general attacks by a postquantum eavesdropper limited only by the impossibility of superluminal signaling. Its security stems from violation of a Bell inequality.
如果量子理论正确，标准量子密钥分发协议在防范窃听攻击方面可被证明是安全的。了解我们是否需要假定量子理论的有效性来证明量子密钥分发的安全性，或者其安全性是否可以基于其他物理原理，这在理论上是很有趣的。如果量子力学在某些情况下失效，这个问题也会具有实际意义，因为一个科学技术先进的窃听者或许能够利用后量子物理从量子通信中提取信息，而不一定会造成现有安全性证明所依赖的量子态干扰。在此，我们描述了一种密钥分发方案，该方案在仅受超光速信号传输不可能这一限制的后量子窃听者的一般攻击下可被证明是安全的。其安全性源于对贝尔不等式的违背。
