DeGrazia D, Rowan A
Department of Philosophy, George Washington University, Washington DC 20052.
Theor Med. 1991 Sep;12(3):193-211. doi: 10.1007/BF00489606.
We attempt to bring the concepts of pain, suffering, and anxiety into sufficient focus to make them serviceable for empirical investigation. The common-sense view that many animals experience these phenomena is supported by empirical and philosophical arguments. We conclude, first, that pain, suffering, and anxiety are different conceptually and as phenomena, and should not be conflated. Second, suffering can be the result--or perhaps take the form--of a variety of states including pain, anxiety, fear, and boredom. Third, pain and nociception are not equivalent and should be carefully distinguished. Fourth, nociception can explain the behavior of insects and perhaps other invertebrates (except possibly the cephalopods). Fifth, a behavioral inhibition system associated with anxiety in humans seems to be present in mammals and most or all other vertebrates. Based on neurochemical and behavioral evidence, it seems parsimonious to claim that these animals are capable of experiencing anxious states.
我们试图将疼痛、痛苦和焦虑的概念充分聚焦，使其适用于实证研究。许多动物会经历这些现象这一常识性观点得到了实证和哲学论证的支持。我们首先得出结论，疼痛、痛苦和焦虑在概念上以及作为现象而言是不同的，不应混为一谈。其次，痛苦可能是包括疼痛、焦虑、恐惧和无聊在内的多种状态的结果——或者可能采取这些状态的形式。第三，疼痛和伤害感受并不等同，应仔细加以区分。第四，伤害感受可以解释昆虫以及或许其他无脊椎动物（可能头足类动物除外）的行为。第五，与人类焦虑相关的行为抑制系统似乎存在于哺乳动物以及大多数或所有其他脊椎动物中。基于神经化学和行为证据，声称这些动物能够体验焦虑状态似乎是合理的。
