Nygård Karin, Werner-Johansen Øyvind, Rønsen Svein, Caugant Dominique A, Simonsen Øystein, Kanestrøm Anita, Ask Eirik, Ringstad Jetmund, Ødegård Rune, Jensen Tore, Krogh Truls, Høiby E Arne, Ragnhildstveit Eivind, Aaberge Ingeborg S, Aavitsland Preben
Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Oslo, Norway.
Clin Infect Dis. 2008 Jan 1;46(1):61-9. doi: 10.1086/524016.
On 21 May 2005, the Norwegian health authorities were alerted by officials from a local hospital that several recent patients had received the diagnosis of legionnaires disease; all patients resided in 2 neighboring municipalities. We investigated the outbreak to identify the source and to implement control measures.
We interviewed all surviving case patients and investigated and harvested samples from 23 businesses with cooling towers and other potential infection sources. The locations of the businesses and the patients' residences and movements were mapped. We calculated attack rates and risk ratios among people living within various radii of each potential source. Isolates of Legionella pneumophila were compared using molecular methods.
Among 56 case patients, 10 died. The case patients became ill 12-25 May, resided up to 20 km apart, and had not visited places in common. Those living up to 1 km from a particular air scrubber had the highest risk ratio, and only for this source did the risk ratio decrease as the radius widened. Genetically identical L. pneumophila serogroup 1 isolates were recovered from patients and the air scrubber. The air scrubber is an industrial pollution-control device that cleans air for dust particles by spraying with water. The circulating water had a high organic content, pH of 8-9, and temperature of 40 degrees C. The air was expelled at 20 m/s and contained a high amount of aerosolized water.
The high velocity, large drift, and high humidity in the air scrubber may have contributed to the wide spread of Legionella species, probably for >10 km. The risk of Legionella spread from air scrubbers should be assessed.
2005年5月21日,当地一家医院的官员向挪威卫生当局发出警报,称最近有几名患者被诊断为军团病;所有患者都居住在相邻的两个自治市。我们对此次疫情进行了调查,以确定源头并实施控制措施。
我们采访了所有幸存的病例患者,并对23家设有冷却塔和其他潜在感染源的企业进行了调查和采样。绘制了企业、患者住所及行动轨迹的位置图。我们计算了每个潜在源头不同半径范围内人群的发病率和风险比。使用分子方法对嗜肺军团菌分离株进行了比较。
56例病例患者中,10人死亡。病例患者于5月12日至25日发病,居住距离最远达20公里,且没有共同去过其他地方。距离某一特定空气洗涤器1公里范围内的人群风险比最高,且只有该源头的风险比随半径增大而降低。从患者和空气洗涤器中分离出了基因相同的嗜肺军团菌血清1型菌株。空气洗涤器是一种工业污染控制设备,通过喷水来清洁空气中的灰尘颗粒。循环水有机物含量高,pH值为8 - 9,温度为40摄氏度。空气以20米/秒的速度排出,含有大量雾化水。
空气洗涤器中的高风速、大漂移和高湿度可能促使军团菌属广泛传播,传播距离可能超过10公里。应评估空气洗涤器传播军团菌的风险。