CEPERC, University of Provence, 29 Avenue Robert Schuman, 13621 Aix en Provence Cedex 1, France.
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 2010 Jan 27;365(1538):259-69. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2009.0177.
Experimental psychology has shown differences between predictions of theory of decision and human choices. Emotions like regret can partly explain these differences. Neuroimagery used in combination with behavioural economics (neuroeconomics) has been used in order to try to disentangle the different emotional and rational factors (regret, rejoicing, reward, costs, uncertainty, trade-off between positive and negative aspects of different options). Emotions then appear as much more complex and mixed affective states than usually assumed. Not only might we feel a positive affect in punishing unfair partners, but mixed emotions can, for example, combine transmutation of previous anxiety into relief and elation by comparison with another less exciting option (elating relief). At the level of complexity of these mixed emotions--which we formally represent by comparisons between 'unexpected utilities' and expected ones--the main biases that Kahnemann and Tversky have shown can be explained. In spite of the complexity of these mixed emotions, some of these hypotheses might be partially tested by brain imagery.
实验心理学已经表明，理论决策与人类选择之间存在差异。像后悔这样的情绪可以部分解释这些差异。神经影像学与行为经济学（神经经济学）相结合已被用于试图理清不同的情感和理性因素（后悔、高兴、奖励、成本、不确定性、不同选项的正负方面之间的权衡）。情绪似乎比通常假设的更复杂和混合的情感状态。例如，我们可能会因为惩罚不公平的伙伴而感到积极的影响，但是混合情绪可以将之前的焦虑转化为与另一个不那么令人兴奋的选择（兴奋的解脱）相比的解脱和欣喜。在这些混合情绪的复杂性水平上——我们通过“意外效用”与预期效用的比较来正式表示——可以解释卡尼曼和特沃斯基所展示的主要偏见。尽管这些混合情绪很复杂，但其中一些假设可以通过大脑成像进行部分验证。
