Barutta Joaquín, Gleichgerrcht Ezequiel, Cornejo Carlos, Ibáñez Agustín
Laboratory of Epistemology and History of Medicine (LEPHIM), Instituto Universitario del Hospital Italiano de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Integr Psychol Behav Sci. 2010 Jun;44(2):127-43. doi: 10.1007/s12124-010-9117-8. Epub 2010 Mar 27.
In cognitive neuroscience, the reissue of the notion of emergence and downward causation has been used as an interlevel model of mind-brain interactions from different perspectives. Within this perspective, intentionality has been interpreted as global to local determination (downward causation) on the neurophysiological level. Consciousness would act as the large-scale, global activity of the system that governs or constrains local interactions of neurons. This argument seems to solve several difficulties with regard to descriptions of consciousness on a neurophysiological and mental level. Nevertheless, the inconsistencies of this argument are shown, and a contextual and pragmatic explanation of the downward causation of consciousness is given.
在认知神经科学中,涌现和向下因果关系概念的重新提出已从不同角度被用作心脑交互的一种跨层次模型。从这个角度来看,意向性在神经生理层面被解释为从全局到局部的决定作用(向下因果关系)。意识将作为系统的大规模全局活动,支配或约束神经元的局部交互。这一观点似乎解决了在神经生理和心理层面描述意识方面的几个难题。然而,本文指出了这一观点的不一致之处,并给出了关于意识向下因果关系的情境性和实用性解释。