University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada.
Mem Cognit. 2010 Sep;38(6):667-76. doi: 10.3758/MC.38.6.667.
Findings from two experiments indicate that probability matching in sequential choice arises from an asymmetry in strategy availability: The matching strategy comes readily to mind, whereas a superior alternative strategy, maximizing, does not. First, compared with the minority who spontaneously engage in maximizing, the majority of participants endorse maximizing as superior to matching in a direct comparison when both strategies are described. Second, when the maximizing strategy is brought to their attention, more participants subsequently engage in maximizing. Third, matchers are more likely than maximizers to base decisions in other tasks on their initial intuitions, suggesting that they are more inclined to use a choice strategy that comes to mind quickly. These results indicate that a substantial subset of probability matchers are victims of "underthinking" rather than "overthinking": They fail to engage in sufficient deliberation to generate a superior alternative to the matching strategy that comes so readily to mind.
两项实验的结果表明,序贯选择中的概率匹配源于策略可用性的不对称:匹配策略很容易出现在脑海中,而优势替代策略——最大化策略却不会。首先,与自发采用最大化策略的少数人相比,当两种策略都被描述时,大多数参与者在直接比较中认为最大化策略优于匹配策略。其次,当最大化策略引起他们的注意时,更多的参与者随后采用最大化策略。第三,与最大化策略的参与者相比,匹配策略的参与者更有可能基于他们的初始直觉来做出其他任务的决策,这表明他们更倾向于快速采用一种策略。这些结果表明,相当一部分概率匹配者是“思考不足”而不是“过度思考”的受害者:他们没有进行足够的深思熟虑,无法产生优于容易出现在脑海中的匹配策略的替代方案。