ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland.
PLoS One. 2010 Oct 12;5(10):e12530. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0012530.
Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across groups with different preferences or beliefs. Yet, people from different social or cultural backgrounds often meet and interact. This can yield conflict, since behavior that is considered cooperative by one population might be perceived as non-cooperative from the viewpoint of another.
To understand the dynamics and outcome of the competitive interactions within and between groups, we study game-dynamical replicator equations for multiple populations with incompatible interests and different power (be this due to different population sizes, material resources, social capital, or other factors). These equations allow us to address various important questions: For example, can cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma be promoted, when two interacting groups have different preferences? Under what conditions can costly punishment, or other mechanisms, foster the evolution of norms? When does cooperation fail, leading to antagonistic behavior, conflict, or even revolutions? And what incentives are needed to reach peaceful agreements between groups with conflicting interests?
Our detailed quantitative analysis reveals a large variety of interesting results, which are relevant for society, law and economics, and have implications for the evolution of language and culture as well.
合作对整个社会至关重要，但往往会受到个人自身利益的挑战。虽然博弈论已经对此问题进行了广泛研究，但对于具有不同偏好或信念的群体内部和群体之间的相互作用却鲜有研究。然而，来自不同社会或文化背景的人经常会相遇并互动。这可能会导致冲突，因为一种人群认为合作的行为，从另一种人群的角度来看可能被视为不合作。
为了了解群体内部和群体之间竞争相互作用的动态和结果，我们研究了具有不兼容利益和不同权力（由于人口规模、物质资源、社会资本或其他因素的不同而导致的权力）的多个群体的博弈动态复制者方程。这些方程使我们能够解决各种重要问题：例如，当两个相互作用的群体具有不同的偏好时，能否促进囚徒困境中的合作？在什么条件下，昂贵的惩罚或其他机制可以促进规范的演变？合作何时失败，导致对抗行为、冲突甚至革命？以及需要哪些激励措施才能在利益冲突的群体之间达成和平协议？
我们详细的定量分析揭示了大量有趣的结果，这些结果与社会、法律和经济学有关，并且对语言和文化的演变也有影响。
