School of Psychology, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK.
Emotion. 2011 Apr;11(2):233-40. doi: 10.1037/a0022598.
We propose that, when people judge moral situations, anger responds to the contextual cues of harm and intentionality. On the other hand, disgust responds uniquely to whether or not a bodily norm violation has occurred; its apparent response to harm and intent is entirely explained by the coactivation of anger. We manipulated intent, harm, and bodily norm violation (eating human flesh) within a vignette describing a scientific experiment. Participants then rated their anger, disgust, and moral judgment, as well as various appraisals. Anger responded independently of disgust to harm and intentionality, whereas disgust responded independently of anger only to whether or not the act violated the bodily norm of cannibalism. Theoretically relevant appraisals accounted for the effects of harm and intent on anger; however, appraisals of abnormality did not fully account for the effects of the manipulations on disgust. Our results show that anger and disgust are separately elicited by different cues in a moral situation.
我们提出,当人们判断道德情境时,愤怒会对伤害和意图的情境线索做出反应。另一方面,厌恶会对身体规范的违反做出独特的反应;它对伤害和意图的明显反应完全可以用愤怒的共同激活来解释。我们在描述一个科学实验的小插曲中操纵了意图、伤害和身体规范的违反(吃人肉)。然后,参与者对他们的愤怒、厌恶和道德判断以及各种评价进行了评分。愤怒对伤害和意图的反应独立于厌恶,而厌恶对行为是否违反了食人主义的身体规范的反应则独立于愤怒。理论上相关的评价解释了伤害和意图对愤怒的影响;然而,对异常的评价并没有完全解释这些操作对厌恶的影响。我们的结果表明,愤怒和厌恶是由道德情境中的不同线索分别引起的。