Riddle Christopher A
The Department of Philosophy / Institute of Applied Ethics, Utica College, 1600 Burrstone Road, Utica, NY 13502, USA.
Med Health Care Philos. 2013 Aug;16(3):377-84. doi: 10.1007/s11019-012-9405-9.
Recent discussions surrounding the conceptualising of disability has resulted in a stalemate between British sociologists and philosophers. The stagnation of theorizing that has occurred threatens not only academic pursuits and the advancement of theoretical interpretations within the Disability Studies community, but also how we educate and advocate politically, legally, and socially. More pointedly, many activists and theorists in the UK appear to believe the British social model is the only effective means of understanding and advocating on behalf of people with disabilities. This model, largely reliant upon materialist research traditions, contends that disability is a form of social oppression and hence, is a phenomenon that should be conceptualised in social terms. Individual properties such as impairments are disregarded as they are viewed to be unimportant in the analysis of the social causes of disability. Concurrently, many bioethicists and philosophers have embraced what Tom Shakespeare has classified as an 'Interactional Approach' to disability--that "the experience of a disabled person results from the relationship between factors intrinsic to the individual, and the extrinsic factors arising from the wider context in which she finds herself". I intend to demonstrate that the benefits of the British social model are now outweighed by its burdens. I suggest, as Jerome Bickenbach has, that while it may be somewhat churlish to critique the social model in light of its political success, taken literally, it implies that people with disabilities require no additional health resources by virtue of their impairments. Despite the eloquent arguments that have preceded me by interactional theorists, none have been accepted as evidence of fallacious reasoning by British social model theorists. This article is an attempt to clarify why it is that the types of arguments British social model theorists have been offering are misguided. I suggest that the British social model, unlike an interactional approach, is unable to provide a realistic account of the experience of disability, and subsequently, unable to be properly utilized to ensure justice for people with disabilities.
最近围绕残疾概念化展开的讨论使英国社会学家和哲学家陷入了僵局。理论化进程的停滞不仅威胁到学术研究以及残疾研究领域内理论阐释的推进,还影响到我们在政治、法律和社会层面的教育与倡导方式。更尖锐的是,英国许多活动家和理论家似乎认为英国社会模式是理解和代表残疾人发声的唯一有效方式。该模式在很大程度上依赖于唯物主义研究传统,主张残疾是一种社会压迫形式,因此应从社会角度进行概念化。诸如损伤等个体特征被忽视,因为在分析残疾的社会成因时,它们被认为并不重要。与此同时,许多生物伦理学家和哲学家接受了汤姆·莎士比亚所归类的对残疾的“互动式方法”——即“残疾人的经历源于个体内在因素与她所处更广泛环境中产生的外在因素之间的关系”。我打算证明,英国社会模式的弊端如今已超过其益处。我赞同杰罗姆·比肯巴赫的观点,即尽管鉴于其政治上的成功而批评社会模式可能有些无礼,但从字面上看,它意味着残疾人因其损伤无需额外的健康资源。尽管互动理论学家在此之前已经进行了有说服力的论证,但没有一个被英国社会模式理论家接受为错误推理的证据。本文旨在阐明为何英国社会模式理论家所提出的这类论点是误导性的。我认为,与互动式方法不同,英国社会模式无法对残疾经历给出现实的解释,因而无法被恰当地用于确保残疾人的公平待遇。