University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada.
Science. 2012 Apr 27;336(6080):493-6. doi: 10.1126/science.1215647.
Scientific interest in the cognitive underpinnings of religious belief has grown in recent years. However, to date, little experimental research has focused on the cognitive processes that may promote religious disbelief. The present studies apply a dual-process model of cognitive processing to this problem, testing the hypothesis that analytic processing promotes religious disbelief. Individual differences in the tendency to analytically override initially flawed intuitions in reasoning were associated with increased religious disbelief. Four additional experiments provided evidence of causation, as subtle manipulations known to trigger analytic processing also encouraged religious disbelief. Combined, these studies indicate that analytic processing is one factor (presumably among several) that promotes religious disbelief. Although these findings do not speak directly to conversations about the inherent rationality, value, or truth of religious beliefs, they illuminate one cognitive factor that may influence such discussions.
近年来，科学界对宗教信仰的认知基础产生了浓厚的兴趣。然而，迄今为止，很少有实验研究关注可能促进宗教不信的认知过程。本研究应用认知加工的双加工模型来解决这个问题，检验了分析加工促进宗教不信的假设。在推理中，个体在分析上克服最初错误直觉的倾向差异与增加的宗教不信有关。四项额外的实验提供了因果关系的证据，因为已知触发分析加工的微妙操纵也鼓励了宗教不信。综合这些研究表明，分析加工是促进宗教不信的因素之一（大概有几个）。虽然这些发现并不能直接说明宗教信仰的内在理性、价值或真实性的对话，但它们阐明了一个可能影响此类讨论的认知因素。
