Conjoint Professor, Faculty of Medicine, University of New South Wales, St Vincent's Hospital, Victoria St, Darlinghurst, Sydney, 2010, Australia.
BMC Med Ethics. 2012 Oct 5;13:26. doi: 10.1186/1472-6939-13-26.
Traditional top-down national regulation of internationally mobile doctors and nurses is fast being rendered obsolete by the speed of globalisation and digitisation. Here we propose a bottom-up system in which responsibility for hiring and accrediting overseas staff begins to be shared by medical employers, managers, and insurers.
In this model, professional Boards would retain authority for disciplinary proceedings in response to local complaints, but would lose their present power of veto over foreign practitioners recruited by employers who have independently evaluated and approved such candidates' ability. Evaluations of this kind could be facilitated by globally accessible National Registers of professional work and conduct. A decentralised system of this kind could also dispense with time-consuming national oversight of continuing professional education and license revalidation, which tasks could be replaced over time by tighter institutional audit supported by stronger powers to terminate underperforming employees.
Market forces based on the reputation (and, hence, financial and political viability) of employers and institutions could continue to ensure patient safety in the future, while at the same time improving both national system efficiency and international professional mobility.
全球化和数字化的快速发展,使得传统的自上而下的国家对国际流动医生和护士的监管方式迅速过时。在这里,我们提出了一种自下而上的系统,其中招聘和认证海外员工的责任开始由医疗雇主、管理人员和保险公司共同承担。
在这种模式下,专业委员会将保留对本地投诉的纪律处分权,但将失去对雇主自行评估和认可的外国从业者的否决权,而这些雇主已经独立评估和认可了这些候选人的能力。这种评估可以通过全球可访问的国家专业工作和行为登记册来促进。这样一种去中心化的系统也可以省去对继续教育和执照更新的耗时的国家监督,这些任务可以随着时间的推移被更严格的机构审计所取代,而审计则得到了更强有力的终止表现不佳员工的权力的支持。
基于雇主和机构声誉(因此是财务和政治可行性)的市场力量,可以在未来继续确保患者安全,同时提高国家系统效率和国际专业流动性。