1] Department of Physics, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong [2] Center for Nonlinear Studies and the Beijing-Hong Kong-Singapore Joint Center for Nonlinear and Complex Systems, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong.
Sci Rep. 2013;3:2470. doi: 10.1038/srep02470.
Recent research has identified interactions between networks as crucial for the outcome of evolutionary games taking place on them. While the consensus is that interdependence does promote cooperation by means of organizational complexity and enhanced reciprocity that is out of reach on isolated networks, we here address the question just how much interdependence there should be. Intuitively, one might assume the more the better. However, we show that in fact only an intermediate density of sufficiently strong interactions between networks warrants an optimal resolution of social dilemmas. This is due to an intricate interplay between the heterogeneity that causes an asymmetric strategy flow because of the additional links between the networks, and the independent formation of cooperative patterns on each individual network. Presented results are robust to variations of the strategy updating rule, the topology of interdependent networks, and the governing social dilemma, thus suggesting a high degree of universality.
最近的研究表明，网络之间的相互作用对于在网络上进行的进化博弈的结果至关重要。虽然人们普遍认为，相互依存关系通过组织复杂性和增强的互惠性来促进合作，而孤立的网络无法实现这种互惠性，但我们在这里要探讨的问题是，相互依存关系应该达到多大程度。直观地说，人们可能会认为相互依存关系越多越好。然而，我们表明，实际上只有在网络之间存在足够强的相互作用的中等密度，才能保证社会困境得到最佳解决。这是由于由于网络之间的额外连接导致了策略流动的不对称性，以及在每个单独的网络上独立形成的合作模式之间的复杂相互作用所致。提出的结果对策略更新规则、相互依存网络的拓扑结构和支配性社会困境的变化具有鲁棒性，因此表明具有高度的普遍性。
