Am J Epidemiol. 2013 Nov 15;178(10):1526-32. doi: 10.1093/aje/kwt223. Epub 2013 Sep 26.
The epidemiologic approach to causal inference (i.e., Hill's viewpoints) consists of evaluating potential causes from the following 2, noncumulative angles: 1) established results from comparative, observational, or experimental epidemiologic studies; and 2) reviews of nonepidemiologic evidence. It does not involve statements of statistical significance. The philosophical roots of Hill's viewpoints are unknown. Superficially, they seem to descend from the ideas of Hume and Mill. Hill's viewpoints, however, use a different kind of evidence and have different purposes than do Hume's rules or Mill's system of logic. In a nutshell, Hume ignores comparative evidence central to Hill's viewpoints. Mill's logic disqualifies as invalid nonexperimental evidence, which forms the bulk of epidemiologic findings reviewed from Hill's viewpoints. The approaches by Hume and Mill cannot corroborate successful implementations of Hill's viewpoints. Besides Hume and Mill, the epidemiologic literature is clueless about a plausible, pre-1965 philosophical origin of Hill's viewpoints. Thus, Hill's viewpoints may be philosophically novel, sui generis, still waiting to be validated and justified.
病因推断的流行病学方法（即希尔观点）包括从以下两个非累积角度评估潜在原因：1）来自比较、观察或实验流行病学研究的既定结果；2）对非流行病学证据的审查。它不涉及统计学意义的陈述。希尔观点的哲学根源尚不清楚。从表面上看，它们似乎源自休谟和穆勒的思想。然而，希尔观点使用了不同类型的证据，并且具有与休谟规则或穆勒逻辑系统不同的目的。简而言之，休谟忽略了对希尔观点至关重要的比较证据。穆勒的逻辑使作为无效的非实验证据失去资格，而这些证据构成了从希尔观点审查的大部分流行病学发现的主体。休谟和穆勒的方法都不能证实希尔观点的成功实施。除了休谟和穆勒，流行病学文献对 1965 年前希尔观点可能存在的合理哲学起源一无所知。因此，希尔观点可能在哲学上是新颖的、独特的，仍在等待验证和证明。
